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INTRODUCTION 
In 1543, the Polish astronomer, Nicolas Copernicus, determined 
the heliocentric design of the solar system.' Copernicus was motivated 
in large part by the conviction that Claudius Ptolemy's geocentric 
astronomical model, which dominated scientific thought at that time, 
was too incoherent, complex, and convoluted to be true.2 Hence, 
Copernicus made a point of making his model coherent, simple, and 
elegant. Nearly three and a half centuries later, at the height of the 
impressionist movement, the French painter Claude Monet set out to 
depict the Ruen Cathedral in a series of twenty paintings,3 each pre­
senting the cathedral in a different light. Monet's goal was to 
demonstrate how his object of study may be perceived by observers 
differently depending on the circumstances of the observation. In the 
spirit of these two projects, in 1972, Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed resolved to craft a comprehensive, yet elegant,4 model for 
1. See JACOB BRONOWSKI & BRUCE MAZLISH, THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL 
TRADITION 113 (1960). For the purpose of historic accuracy, it is important to note that 1543 
was the year in which Copernicus published his REVOLUTIONS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 
It is highly likely that Copernicus completed his account well before 1543, but was afraid that 
his views would offend the religious establishment of his time. Thus, Copernicus delayed the 
publication of his book until 1543, the year of his death, and rumor has it that he died hold­
ing the first printed copy of the book in his hands. Id. 
2. Id. at 112·15. 
3. See KARIN SAGNER·DOCHTING, CLAUDE MONET, 1840-1926, at 172-73 (1998). 
4. See Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 
2201, 2202 (1997) (hereinafter Calabresi, Remarks) (stating that the Calabresi-Melamedian 
framework was intended to be simple and elegant); Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2155 {1997) (com­
mending Calabresi and Melamed for the elegance of their model). 
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organizing the universe of legal entitlements.5 The article's impact has 
been profound and enduring.6 
In their path-breaking article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,1 Calabresi and Melamed es­
tablished a new way of conceptualizing legal rights and duties. De­
parting from traditional jurisprudential notions, Calabresi and 
Melamed introduced the concepts of "property rules" and "liability 
rules" as the ordering principles of the legal system, and then analyzed 
their virtues and vices as means of protecting legal entitlements. Prop­
erty rule protection forces potential takers to secure the consent of the 
entitlement owner, and thus allows the owner to determine the price 
of her entitlement. Liability rule protection, by contrast, allows poten­
tial takers to avail themselves of other people's entitlements as long as 
they are willing to pay a collectively determined price that is usually 
set by a court, a legislator, or an administrative agency.8 
Having introduced the distinction between property rules and li­
ability rules, Calabresi and Melamed ventured to explain how these 
rules should be employed to promote economic efficiency. Their nor­
mative insight was that property rules should be favored over liability 
5. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal­
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Following convention, 
we will call the article The Cathedral. 
6. Virtually all citation studies list Calabresi and Melamed's article as one of the top 
thirty most-cited articles. See, e.g. , Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 1540 (1985); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 
71 Qu.-KENT L. REV. 751 (1996). According to Shapiro's citation studies, The Cathedral 
ranked twenty-second in 1985, and climbed up to number eleven in 1996. A different study 
by Krier and Schwab ranks The Cathedral as the fourteenth most cited article. See James E. 
Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, The Cathedral at Twenty Five: Citations and Impressions, 106 
YALE L.J. 2121, 2140 (1997) [hereinafter Krier & Schwab, Citations and Impressions]. 
It bears emphasis, however, that no citation study can capture the full impact of The 
Cathedral. In our experience, very few scholarly works have affected legal thought as did 
The Cathedral. Our impression is consistent with the findings of Krier and Schwab, who re­
port that "Calabresi and Melamed's contribution to the literature has had a significant and 
ongoing, even increasing, influence." Id. at 2130. They, too, note that "evidence of the im­
portance of their work is found in the many anthologies, casebooks, and textbooks that re­
produce [the work] in whole or in part or otherwise discuss or refer to it." Id. Furthermore, 
the framework devised by Calabresi and Melamed is taught and discussed in property and 
tort law classes, and is often extended to other legal fields. See Levmore, supra note 4, at 
2151 (noting that "some of the value of the Calabresi-Melamed framework lies in its ability 
to illuminate fields outside of traditional property and tort law"); accord Krier & Schwab, 
Citations and Impressions, supra at 2130 (noting that "Calabresi and Melamed's article fig­
ures regularly in books on subjects like Property, Torts, and Contracts"). 
7. 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
8. In principle, the price of the use may be determined by any third party. For example, 
two parties may contractually agree to accept any price X would set for the entitlement. The 
determination may occur either ex ante, before the taking occurs, or ex post, following the 
taking. 
As the title of their article suggests, Calabresi and Melamed also discussed a third type 
of protection: inalienability rules. An entitlement protected by an inalienability rule cannot 
be transferred at any price. 
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rules when transaction costs are low, and parties can cost-effectively 
bargain with one another. When, on the other hand, transaction costs 
are high, and voluntary bargaining cannot be expected, liability rules 
should be employed. 
In the vast literature that followed,9 commentators have attempted 
to refine, revamp, and, at times, challenge the Calabresi-Melamedian 
analysis. In particular, attempts have been made to distinguish be­
tween various types of transaction costs, and then examine which type 
of rules is better suited to combat each particular cost. Yet, the ana­
lytical structure devised by Calabresi and Melamed, and in particular, 
the foundational distinction between property and liability rules, has 
been accepted by virtually all the commentators - supporters and 
critics alike. The Calabresi-Melamedian typology has been widely un­
derstood to exhaust all possible ways of protecting legal entitlements, 
and the binary system they devised has dominated legal thought and 
scholarship. Almost thirty years after its publication, The Cathedral is 
experiencing a renaissance as increasing numbers of preeminent 
scholars flock to reevaluate and improve upon Calabresi and 
Melamed's classic.10 This Article shares the same ambition. 
We contend that, while the Calabresi-Melamedian framework pre­
sents a solid basis for understanding legal entitlements, 11 a more com-
9. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the 
Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and 
Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land 
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance 
Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 
(1999); Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?, 70 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 741 (1997); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability 
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, 
The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from 
Behavioral Studies, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 219 (2001); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Li­
ability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. 
REV. 1293 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in 
Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001); Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and En­
forcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837 (1997); A. Mitchell 
Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage 
Remedies, 32 STAN . L. REV. 1075 (1980); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the 
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985); Symposium, Property Rules, Li­
ability Rules and Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106 YALE L.J. 2081 
(1997). This list is intended to be illustrative; it is far from being exhaustive. We discuss 
many other articles in the text and in subsequent footnotes. 
10. See sources cited supra note 9. 
11.  A brief caveat is in order here. It is very possible that Calabresi and Melamed 
noticed other ways to protect legal entitlements, but decided, for the sake of simplicity and 
elegance, to discuss only property, liability, and inalienability rules in their celebrated article. 
As Calabresi illuminated in a recent symposium that marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
The Cathedral, crucial distinctions and nuances "were left out because I had to make [the 
article] simple so that people would understand it." Calabresi, Remarks, supra note 4, at 
2202. It is safe to assert, however, that The Cathedral does not discuss, or even mention, pli­
ability rules and the important functions they serve in the legal system. 
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plete analysis must probe beyond the ostensible dichotomy between 
property and liability rules. We seek to add another level to Calabresi 
and Melamed's analysis, to capture fully the protection of entitlements 
in our legal system. 
By looking at their cathedral frozen in a moment in time - as in a 
single one of Monet's paintings - Calabresi and Melamed have 
overlooked the importance of examining the cathedral over the course 
of time, as did Monet's series. More concretely, by focusing their at­
tention on static property and liability rules, Calabresi and Melamed 
have obscured the possibility of protecting legal entitlements by means 
of dynamic rules that we call "pliability rules. "12 
Pliability, or pliable, rules are contingent rules that provide an enti­
tlement owner with property rule or liability rule protection as long as 
some specified condition obtains; however, once the relevant condi­
tion changes, a different rule protects the entitlement - either liability 
or property, as the circumstances dictate. Pliability rules, in other 
words, are dynamic rules, while property and liability rules are static. 
This can be seen by revisiting the famous case of Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement Co.13 In Boomer, homeowners near a manufacturing plant of 
Atlantic Cement complained that the plant's pollution gave rise to an 
actionable nuisance, and they sought an injunction that would close 
down the plant. The court, however, decided to permit the plant to 
continue operations, subject to its payment of permanent damages to 
the homeowners. Calabresi and Melamed viewed the case as present­
ing a choice between enforcing property rule protection, as the home­
owners demanded, or liability rule protection, as the court eventually 
ruled. Calabresi and Melamed believed these to be the two basic op­
tions14 because they - like the theorists that followed them - focused 
on discrete moments of legal protection in isolation. In reality, though, 
the court could have chosen a pliability rule. For example, the court 
might have allowed Atlantic Cement to pay damages and continue 
operating for five years to avoid immediate and massive layoffs at the 
plant, but also decree that at the end of the five years, the injunction 
would become absolute to enable homeowners' quiet and clean use of 
their realty.15 This pliable rule - a five-year liability rule, followed by 
12. The tenn "pliability rule" owes its origin to Peter Siegelman, who suggested it in a 
conversation with one of the authors. 
13. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
14. Calabresi and Melamed allowed for four options: property rule protection in the 
hands of either the homeowner or plant, and liability rule protection for either the home­
owner or plant. 
15. As we discuss later, pliability rules can come in many fonns, and may involve any 
number of different combinations of property and liability rules. See infra Part II. 
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indefinite property rule protection - would permit the court to com­
bine the features of liability and property rules over the course of 
time. 
While the term "pliability rule" is original, this mode of legal enti­
tlement has long existed in our legal system. The legal protection of 
share ownership in mergers is a classic example of a positive pliability 
rule. Consider the case of a corporate takeover succeeded by a freeze­
out. The minority shareholders can either accept the price offered by 
the acquirer or exercise their appraisal right, in which case a court will 
determine the appropriate compensation. In either case, the minority 
shareholders lose the ability to refuse to part with their shares. In 
other words, their initial property rule protection changes into a 
liability rule. As in other liability rules, the price they will receive is 
not determined by them; it is set by a third party. 
Likewise, a real property owner may lose her property right if she 
allows adverse possessors to take hold of her land and use it openly for 
a statutorily specified period. The property rule protection of the 
landowner is conditional since it depends on her vigilance in safe­
guarding her land against potential takers. Failure to perform this duty 
erases the original protection of the land and transfers it to the 
adverse possessor. Adverse possession thus creates a "title shifting pli­
ability rule," that is, a combination of property rules in which the trig­
gering of a condition transfers property rule protection from the origi­
nal entitlement holder to another. 
Another pervasive kind of pliability rule in the law is "the zero or­
der pliability rule." In fact, zero order pliability rules are the organiz­
ing principle of much of our intellectual property law. In zero order 
pliability rules, property rule protection is succeeded by a no liability 
rule. Specifically, upon a triggering event, the initial entitlement 
holder loses the ability to exercise property rule protection, such as 
the right to exclude, over her property. Instead the entitlement holder 
must allow all comers to use the property free of charge - that is, with 
zero order liability. Importantly, the subject item has not been aban­
doned. Notwithstanding the zero order liability, no third party may 
gain a superior right to that of the original entitlement holder. Rather, 
zero order pliability rules create anti-exclusion, or open access re­
gimes. Consider, for example, a patent. A patent confers upon the 
patentee property rule protection for twenty years, but, upon the expi­
ration of that term, the nature of protection changes from a property 
rule to a zero order liability rule since she can no longer refuse others 
the right to use her patent.16 Copyright law provides a similar example. 
16. To be sure, it is possible to think of other ways of characterizing patent protection. 
For instance, it is possible to view it as a property rule limited in time. Alternatively, it is 
possible to classify patent protection as a property rule protection to the patentee followed 
by a property rule protection to the user. We do not dispute that both of these alternative 
characterizations are plausible. Both, however, obfuscate the possibility of viewing patent 
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These examples, and others, show the attractiveness of pliability 
rules. Pliability rules combine two separate rules; with the passage be­
tween the two stages of rule protection triggered by a preset condition. 
Owing to their amalgamated nature, pliability rules are capable of 
combining the respective strengths of property and liability rules while 
avoiding their respective weaknesses. Pliability rules allow decision­
makers to avoid the all-or-nothing decision of creating property rule 
or liability rule protection. Instead, decisionmakers may build flexibil­
ity into the rule, setting conditions that switch from a stronger to a 
weaker protection of entitlements (or vice versa) when economic effi­
ciency or fairness considerations so require. As a result, pliability rules 
present decision makers with a wide array of options that are unavail­
able to them in the Calabresi-Melamedian bipolar world of property 
and liability rules. 
This Article has three goals: the first conceptual, the second de­
scriptive, and the last normative. Conceptually, we demonstrate that 
pliability rules fall in a distinct category of rule protection, and that 
they must be recognized alongside their more familiar counterparts -
property and liability rules. Descriptively, we show that, although this 
fact may have eluded Calabresi and Melamed,17 pliability rules are 
widely used in our legal system. Furthermore, we devise a typology of 
pliability rules to illuminate the myriad options the use of such rules 
presents to policy makers. Normatively, we argue that in many cases 
pliability rules can promote economic efficiency, and fairness, better 
than either property rules or liability rules. The two main legal fields 
we use to substantiate these claims are property and intellectual prop­
erty, but we also show that pliability rules are present in other legal 
areas, such as antitrust and corporate law. 
protection as a continuum starting with property rule protection, which endures for twenty 
years, and then shifts into a zero order liability rule. Thinking of patent protection as a "zero 
order pliability rule" is helpful as it sensitizes one to the possibility of "positive pliability 
rules," i.e., pliability rules which set the liability amount above zero. Furthermore, it is im­
portant to recall that patent and copyright differ from traditional property rights because 
they are limited in time; standard property rights, on the other hand, may exist in perpetuity. 
Thus, it is useful to distinguish the theoretical characterization of the protection accorded by 
the Patent and Copyright Acts from that accorded to regular property entitlements. For 
these reasons, we propose that patent and copyright protection should be thought of as zero 
order pliability rules. 
The idea of equating no-liability with zero-liability protection draws on a famous insight 
of Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, who, in characterizing U.C.C. § 2-201, provided that a 
contract failing to specify quantity is enforceable as a "zero-quantity default." They justify 
the "zero-quantity default" by noting "it is cheaper for the parties to establish the quantity 
term beforehand than for the courts to determine after the fact what the parties would have 
wanted." Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. f57, 96 (1989). 
17. See Levmore, supra note 4, at 2157 (noting that because Calabresi and Melamed 
sought elegance as opposed to comprehensiveness, it would be wrong to describe them as 
having "missed" remedies not explicitly discussed in their article). 
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Structurally, the Article consists of three parts. In Part I, we review 
Calabresi and Melamed's seminal article, as well as its predecessors 
and progeny. In Part II, we present the concept of pliability rules. We 
identify the many areas of law in which pliability rules are already in 
use, and discuss how the use of pliability rules serves to promote effi­
ciency and fairness. Among the instances of pliability rule protection 
we discuss are those used in eminent domain, copyright, antitrust, and 
corporate law, as well as the doctrine of adverse possession. Finally, in 
Part III, we draw on the analysis in Part II to suggest how policymak­
ers may use pliability rules in the future to enhance social utility. Here, 
we show how a pliability analysis can reshape key doctrines of prop­
erty and intellectual property law. We then venture even further and 
demonstrate how the use of pliability rules can be used to overcome 
anticommons problems that plague the integrity of such vulnerable so­
cial units as Native American tribes and rural African-American 
communities. We conclude by discussing the potential of a pliability 
analysis to revolutionize the doctrine of eminent domain. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF ENTITLEMENT THEORY 
A. Coase and the Problem of Social Cost 
To fully appreciate the contribution of Calabresi and Melamed, it 
is necessary to begin with Ronald Coase's seminal article The Problem 
of Social Cost.18 Importantly, Coase was not interested in the assign­
ment of legal entitlements per se, but rather in the problem of exter­
nalities - the costs and benefits of one's activity on third parties that 
are not captured by the price system. The paradigmatic manifestation 
of the externalities problem that concerned Coase and his contempo­
raries was industrial pollution.19 Coase's primary aim was to challenge 
the Pigouvian theory that government intervention in the form of 
taxation was necessary to remedy the problem of social cost. Specifi­
cally, Pigou had proposed that the government levy a tax on polluters 
in the amount of the social harm they cause in order to force them to 
consider this cost in their production decisions.20 By contrast to Pigou, 
and the other theorists of his time, who focused exclusively on the 
18. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
19. See Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 647, 684 n.87 (2000) (noting that " [i]n his critique of Pigouvian taxes, Coase 
proposed that property rights could internalize pollution externalities"); cf Carol M. Rose, 
The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2189 (1997) [hereinafter Rose, Shadow of 
the Cathedral) (noting that Calabresi and Melamed cited "air pollution and noise (including 
the ubiquitous Boomer) as examples of negative 'externalities' "). For a more recent treat­
ment of industrial pollution using the Calabresi-Melamedian framework, see Kaplow & 
Shavell, supra note 9, at 748-52. 
20. See ARTHUR c. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 159 (2d ed. 1925); ARTHUR 
C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912). 
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polluter, Coase observed that pollution - as well as all other exter­
nalities - are reciprocal in nature. Coase was the first to notice that, 
in principle, not only the wrongdoer but also the victim can eliminate 
the harm. If pollution from a nearby factory prevents residents from 
hanging their laundry outdoors, the harm can be eliminated in one of 
two ways: the factory can install smokescreens on its chimneys or the 
residents can purchase electric dryers.21 
Realizing the reciprocal nature of the externalities problem en­
abled Coase to notice an important connection between contracts and 
torts. More specifically, it enabled Coase to see that private bargaining 
may substitute for regulatory intervention as a means of controlling 
social harms. From there, the Coase theorem was very much in sight, 
but it took another ingenious step to get there. 
To demonstrate the flaw in Pigou's analysis, Coase conjured up a 
frictionless world in which transacting is costless.22 He then showed 
that, in such a world, private bargaining would always yield the eco­
nomically efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of legal 
entitlements or liabilities. 23 Coase recognized the need for clear de­
lineation and assignment of legal entitlements as a prerequisite for 
bargaining even in his zero transaction cost world.24 But once this task 
is accomplished, no other legal rules are necessary since private bar­
gaining would override any legal norm and result in efficient resource 
21. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCCTON TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-14 
(2d ed. 1989). 
22. Cf. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174 (1988) ("The world 
of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could be fur­
ther from the truth. It is the world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to 
persuade, economists to leave."). 
23. This formulation has come to be known as the "strong version," or the "invariance 
version" of the Coase Theorem. See Thomas S. Ulen, Flogging a Dead Pig: Professor Posin 
on the Coase Theorem, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 91 {1991). A "weaker" version of the Coase 
Theorem maintains that in a world without transaction costs the allocation of entitlements 
would not influence the total value of output, but it might affect the use of resources and the 
pattern of output. See Robert D. Cooter, The Coase Theorem, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS {1987). It is debatable whether either version of the Coase 
theorem actually holds. Famously, Robert Cooter has pointed out that even in a world with 
zero transaction costs, strategic bargaining may thwart efficient allocation of resources. See 
Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 {1982). A different concern has 
been raised by Clifford Holderness, who proposes that the strong version only holds true 
when entitlements are granted to closed groups, but not when they are given to open groups 
that allow entry. See Clifford G. Holderness, The Assignment of Rights, Entry Effects, and 
the Allocation of Resources, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 181 (1989). But see Henry E. Smith, Two 
Dimensions of Property Rights (Mar. 31, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, cited in Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 9, at 368 n.45) (suggesting that "[i]f transaction costs were truly zero . . .  
bargaining could costlessly close all classes"). It should be emphasized that the Coase theo­
rem does not guarantee efficiency in positive transaction cost settings. See Dierdre 
McCloskey, Other Things Equal: The So-Called Coase Theorem, 24 E. ECON. J. 367 (1998). 
24. Coase, supra note 18, at 8. But see Steven N.S. Cheung, The Transaction Costs Para­
digm, 37 ECON. INQ. 514, 518-20 (1998) (questioning the need for a well-defined system of 
entitlement in a world with zero transaction costs). 
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allocation. If clean air were more valuable than the activity causing the 
pollution, residents would pay plants to shut down; if the opposite 
were true, industrial companies would pay residents to relocate.25 Pri­
vate ordering would rule; law could be shunted aside. 
The transition to the real world, in the second part of the article, 
thrust law back to the fore. The introduction of positive transaction 
costs forced Coase to address the significance of legal rules, as well as 
of the courts administering them. Once the assumption of zero trans­
action costs is abandoned, Coase's analysis, although still illuminating, 
loses some of its analytical rigor. Coase's general prescription is that in 
a world with positive transaction costs, courts should assign property 
rights in a manner that maximizes the value of production.26 In as­
sessing the ability of the courts to reach efficient outcomes in particu­
lar cases, Coase reviewed a host of nuisance decisions. Although he 
failed to trace any economic theorizing in the decisions, and worse, he 
found the reasoning employed by the courts odd and irrelevant,27 
Coase concluded, somewhat surprisingly, that courts are conscious of 
the economic consequences of their decisions. Thus, at the end of the 
day, Coase was willing to entrust the courts with the challenging task 
of allocating legal entitlements efficiently. 
Coase, however, did not provide the courts with any meaningful 
guidance as to how to perform this task. All he had to say was that, 
insofar as this is at all possible, courts should consult economic consid­
erations in making their decisions without creating too much uncer­
tainty about the legal position itself . . . .  "28 This proposal exposes an 
25. An obvious problem with this conclusion, as well as with the Coase theorem in gen­
eral, is that it ignores wealth effects. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal 
Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 385-
91 (1991) (noting that Coase's model overlooks cognitive biases, such as wealth and framing 
effects); see also Ian Ayres & Jack Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 718 n.52 (1998) (explaining that "wealth ef­
fects are produced by budget constraints on our ability to pay"). Although residents affected 
by the pollution may value the right to live pollution-free more highly than the activity gen­
erating the pollution, they may not have sufficient resources to pay the plants, causing the 
problem to shut down. If transactors do not possess sufficient funds, assuming away transac­
tion costs would not help bring about efficient allocation of resources. See Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 797-808 
(1990) (noting that wealth effects are more common than is sometimes thought); William M. 
Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 21 (2000) (listing the absence of transaction costs and wealth effects 
as two preconditions for effective operation of the Coase theorem). But see Russell 
Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Effi­
cient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663, 679-82 (1994) (disputing Hovenkamp's 
wealth effect claims); cf Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1483 (1998) (observing that "even 
when transaction costs and wealth effects are known to be zero, initial entitlements alter the 
final allocation of resources"). 
26. See Coase, supra note 18, at 15-16. 
27. See id. at 15. 
28. Id. at 19. 
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inherent tension in Coase's analysis. On the one hand, Coase's article 
calls for a clear delimitation of legal rights in order to encourage pri­
vate bargaining. On the other hand, its reliance on the courts injects a 
considerable degree of uncertainty into the legal system as it necessi­
tates extensive use of judicial discretion to promote efficiency in par­
ticular cases. More importantly, perhaps, the two perspectives devel­
oped in Coase's article - the contractarian and the judicial - are in 
potential conflict when transaction costs are positive. The more courts 
exercise judicial restraint . by deferring to private bargaining, the 
stronger the incentive to bargain privately. Conversely, when courts 
take an interventionist approach to private ordering, the incentive to 
bargain privately over efficient allocation of resources is significantly 
undermined. Yet, Coase did not suggest how this tension can be re­
solved, or which perspective, the contractarian or the judicial, should 
take precedence in cases of conflict. Ultimately, Coase advanced nei­
ther a theory, nor a list of factors, to help the courts in performing 
their charge; he trusted them, based on past performance, albeit a very 
mediocre one, to succeed in the future. 
Despite these drawbacks, Coase's analysis is illuminating and it has 
been extremely influential. It would not be an exaggeration to state 
that Coase's discussion of transaction costs blazed the trail for all sub­
sequent law and economics scholars. In particular, Coase's focus on 
contractual arrangements has elevated private bargaining to unprece­
dented heights, turning it into the primary focus of law and economics 
scholarship. Yet, Coase's analysis by itself did not aptly explain the 
role of legal norms in promoting efficiency; nor did it provide a posi­
tive account of how exactly, if at all, the law protects entitlements in 
the real world. Moreover, Coase did not discuss how entitlements 
should be protected after the initial allocation. These tasks were re­
served for Calabresi and Melamed. 
B. The Calabresian-Melamedian Framework 
Unlike Coase, whose primary goal was to determine the role of 
government intervention in the regulation of harmful activities, 
Calabresi and Melamed's goal was to analyze the role of law in the as­
signment and protection of entitlements. Specifically, Calabresi and 
Melamed sought to shed light on the ways in which the legal system 
does, and ought to, protect rights. Yet, Coase's insights had a palpable 
influence on Calabresi and Melamed. His contractarian perspective 
and the careful attention to transaction . costs informed much of 
Calabresi and Melamed's normative analysis. Due to their different 
focus and superior mastery of law, however, Calabresi and Melamed 
ventured far beyond Coase's legal insights and developed a new con­
ceptualization of the law. 
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In The Cathedral, Calabresi and Melamed made three important 
contributions to legal theory. The first was conceptual. Calabresi and 
Melamed were the first to realize that a theory of entitlement alloca­
tion must address two questions, not one. One question is how to as­
sign the entitlement initially between the contending parties. The 
other is how to protect the initial assignment.29 In addressing the for­
mer question, Calabresi and Melamed did not advance a simple an­
swer, or even a single principle according to which entitlements should 
be assigned. Instead, they proposed that in assigning entitlements, so­
ciety should consider three broad types of considerations: economic 
efficiency, distributional preferences, and other justice reasons.30 
Calabresi and Melamed discussed and explored all three concerns, 
and, in contrast to Coase, they did not single out one value the courts 
should maximize. Rather, they advocated a careful weighing of the 
various criteria they listed as a basis for entitlement allocation in par­
ticular cases.31 
Calabresi and Melamed's second important contribution was de­
scriptive. In analyzing how the law protects entitlements, Calabresi 
and Melamed divided the universe of legal remedies into three mo­
dalities of protection: property rules, liability rules, and inalienability 
rules.32 They defined the three modalities as follows. Property rule 
protection confers upon the entitlement holder the exclusive power to 
determine the price nonholders would have to pay for using the pro­
tected asset or right.33 Thus, all transfers of entitlements protected by a 
property rule must be consensual; all attempts to transfer the entitle­
ment nonconsensually would be met with an injunction. Liability rule 
protection, by contrast, gives the nonholder the power to take the enti­
tlement without the consent of the entitlement holder and pay a price 
to be determined by a third party, typically a court or the legislature. 
The entitlement holder would not be able to enjoin third parties from 
taking her entitlement; instead, she would have to settle for damages.34 
29. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1089-93. 
30. Id. at 1093-95. Calabresi and Melamed recognized that it is hard to pour content into 
the term "justice reasons." Id. at 1102. Furthermore, they admitted that, broadly defined, 
distributional considerations can subsume all other justice reasons. Id. at 1104. Yet, they 
suggested that it is preferable to think of considerations such as equality, caste preferences, 
and other idiosyncratic preferences, separately from traditional distributional considerations. 
Id. at 1098. 
31. Id. at 1093-1105. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-33 
(1970) (discussing economic efficiency, distributional preferences, and other justice consid­
erations as bases for entitlement allocation). 
32. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1092, 1 105-06. 
33. Id. at 1092, 1 105. 
34. Id. at 1092, 1106-10. Coleman and Kraus have criticized the idea of liability rule pro­
tection for being at odds with the classic view of rights as domains of freedom and personal 
autonomy. See Jules Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 
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Finally, inalienability rules bar all transfers of the entitlement, whether 
consensual or nonconsensual.35 
Moreover, Calabresi and Melamed noticed the existence of what 
Carol Rose later called "bilateral symmetry;"36 namely, that property 
and liability rule protection may be accorded to either of the parties to 
the conflict.37 This insight enabled Calabresi and Melamed to craft 
their famous four-rule menu, which captures the remedial choices 
available to courts. To illustrate the operation of the four different 
rules, it would be helpful to return to the pollution dispute example. 
Assume, first, that society decides to favor the residents' interest in 
clean air. In this case, a court can vindicate the residents' right to live 
pollution-free either by enjoining the polluting activity (rule 1), or by 
conditioning the continuance of the pollution on the payment of dam­
ages to the victims (rule 2). Conversely, if society assigns the initial en­
titlement to the factory owner, the court can vindicate her right to 
pollute by permitting her to pollute with impunity (rule 3), or by con­
ditioning the abatement of the pollution on the payment of damages 
to the factory owner (rule 4). The four-rule framework and the taxon­
omy developed by Calabresi and Melamed to describe the different 
rules have become staples in legal scholarship and teaching.38 
Calabresi and Melamed's third important contribution was norma­
tive. In analyzing how the legal system should protect entitlements, 
Calabresi and Melamed successfully synthesized the contractarian and 
95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1339 (1995). Furthermore, Coleman and Kraus have noted that the pro­
tection accorded changes the nature of the entitlement. Id. at 1346. · 
35. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1092. Later in the article, Calabresi and 
Melamed broadened the definition of inalienability rules to include not only outright prohi­
bition on transfers, but also weaker forms of regulatory oversight. Id. at 1111. According to 
Calabresi and Melamed, inalienability rule protection may be appropriate when changes in 
the initial assignment have untoward effects on third parties, or for paternalistic or distribu­
tional reasons. Id. at 1111-15. 
36. Rose, Shadow of the Cathedral, supra note 19, at 2177. 
37. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1115-17; see also James E. Krier & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 440, 444 (1995) [hereinafter Krier & Schwab, The Cathedral in Another Light] (map­
ping the symmetrical relation in a two-by-two matrix). 
38. It is noteworthy that at the time The Cathedral was authored, rules 1 through 3 were 
well known, but rule 4 was not. Indeed, at the time, there were no cases in which rule 4 was 
employed. Fortunately for Calabresi and Melamed, the year The Cathedral was published, 
the Arizona Supreme Court, in Spur Industries Inc. v. Dell E. Webb Development Co.,  494 
P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972), enjoined the operator of a feedlot from continuing its operation, 
but ordered that a developer representing residents indemnify the tortfeasor for the cost of 
moving or shutting down. Although it was believed that Calabresi and Melamed were the 
first to unveil rule 4, it was, in fact, suggested several years earlier by James Atwood in a 
student note in the Stanford Law Review. See James R. Atwood, Note, An Economic Analy­
sis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REV. 293, 315 (1969); see also Calabresi, Remarks, 
supra note 4, at 2204 (attributing the "discovery" of rule 4 to Atwood). Yet, it is indisputable 
that rule 4 has become famous thanks to its inclusion in the Calabresian-Melamedian 
framework. 
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judicial perspective raised by Coase.39 They proposed that property 
rules be employed when transaction costs are low, when there are only 
a few parties to the dispute, and when the parties to the dispute are 
readily identifiable.40 When these conditions obtain, there is no need 
for legal intervention since the private transacting would lead to an ef­
ficient allocation of resources. Liability rules, on the other hand, 
should be used in the presence of high transaction costs, which prevent 
the parties from easily identifying and bargaining with one another.41 
Calabresi and Melamed's normative analysis has solidified the 
dominance of private ordering over public ordering. Private ordering, 
through transacting, should take precedence over legal intervention. It 
is only when we suspect that private bargaining might be ineffective 
that we should resort to legal intervention. Otherwise, the law should 
merely provide the backdrop against which private bargaining takes 
place. The centrality of private bargaining to Calabresi and Melamed 
is most evident in their discussion of the criminal law. The role 
Calabresi and Melamed assign to the criminal law is not to protect in­
dividual rights and personal security, but rather, to deter "attempts to 
convert property rules into liability rules."42 
However, the strong emphasis on bargaining, the potential weak­
ness of Calabresian-Melamedian framework, was also the source of its 
appeal and success. This focus enabled Calabresi and Melamed to 
propose a revolutionary way of thinking about the law. Moreover, it 
enabled them to keep their analysis coherent and elegant. Yet, 
Calabresi and Melamed's analysis was not at all one-dimensional; nor 
did it only seek to maximize economic efficiency. Another laudable 
aspect of Calabresi and Melamed's analysis was the call for the incor­
poration of fairness-based considerations into entitlement theory. Un­
fortunately, this aspect of the article has not attracted nearly as much 
attention as the efficiency analysis. In fact, it was largely ignored by 
subsequent commentators.43 
39. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1108-10. 
40. Id. at 1125-27. 
41. See id. ; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56-57, 70 (4th 
ed. 1992) (discussing the "conventional wisdom" favoring property rules where transaction 
costs are low, and liability rules where transaction costs are high); Krier & Schwab, The 
Cathedral in Another Light, supra note 37, at 447-53 (presenting the "conventional wisdom" 
for later critique); cf Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 718 (noting that their findings con­
tradict the "conventional wisdom"). 
42. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1126. Cf HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 15 (1997). Dagan argues that the choice between property rules and liability 
rules embodies a choice between well-being and control, with liability rules protecting the 
former and property rules protecting the latter. Thus, "the choice between the two rules re­
quires a choice of the substantive content of the entitlement itself." Id. (footnote omitted). 
43. We seek to redress this omission in Part III, infra. 
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C. Subsequent Contributions 
As one could expect, The Cathedral has not met with universal ac­
ceptance. Subsequent scholars have challenged both the descriptive 
and the normative claims of the article.44 The normative challenges 
have targeted Calabresi and Melamed's prescriptions as to how prop­
erty and liability rules should be applied to enhance economic effi­
ciency. The descriptive challenges have focused on the accuracy and 
comprehensiveness of Calabresi and Melamed's portrayal of the legal 
system.45 We commence by reviewing the normative challenges and 
then turn to the descriptive ones. 
1. Normative Challenges 
a. Ayres and Talley's Solomonic Entitlements. Following Calabresi 
and Melamed, the accepted lore was that property rules outperform 
liability rules when disputes involve a small number of parties and the 
costs of identifying the relevant parties are low. In such settings, the 
empl9yment of property rules was presumed to induce successful pri­
vate bargaining and consequently efficient allocation of resources.46 
Ayres and Talley called this view into question. They contended that 
liability rules might be superior to property rules in settings in which 
property rules were believed to work best: thin markets.47 To reach 
this somewhat counterintuitive claim, Ayres and Talley recharacter­
ized two important components in the Calabresi-Melamedian frame­
work: liability rules and transaction costs. 
Ayres and Talley began their account by pointing out that the use 
of liability rules divides entitlements into an option to buy the subject 
44. A comprehensive review of all the challenges is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Naturally, we focus on the challenges that are most relevant to our discussion. We do not 
suggest that the challenges we discuss are necessarily the most important or powerful ones. 
45. Admittedly, this distinction involves a degree of imprecision. Some of the challenges 
we label normative also contain descriptive insights, and vice versa. Yet, this distinction 
helps organize the subsequent literature in a sensible fashion. 
46. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
47. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1030-33 (1995). In parallel with Ayres and 
Talley, Johnston reached a similar finding. See Jason S. Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules 
Versus Standards, 1 1  J.L. ECON. & ORO. 256 (1995). Johnston demonstrated that when cer­
tain conditions obtain, contingent ex post entitlements may produce more efficient bargain­
ing than clear ex ante entitlements. An important implication of this observation is that 
blurry balancing tests and even judicial error are more socially desirable than previously 
thought. In a subsequent article, Johnston and Croson adduced experimental results that 
offer support of the theoretic predictions of Johnston's model. See Rachel Croson & Jason S. 
Johnston, Experimental Results on Bargaining Under Alternative Property Rights Regimes, 16 
J.L. ECON. & ORO. 50 (2000). In the text, we focus on Ayres and Talley simply because they 
framed their analysis in property versus liability rule terms, whereas Johnston's main prism 
is that of rules versus standards. 
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of the entitlement48 and a right subject to the option.49 Moreover, they 
insightfully observed that this division creates a unique opportunity 
for "Solomonic bargaining" between the holders of the divided enti­
tlement. Because the partition of the entitlement permits two-way 
trading, rather than one, liability rules could generate more private 
bargaining than property rules. If the option-holder values the subject 
of the entitlement more highly than the right holder, she would exer­
cise her option and buy the right. Conversely, if the right holder values 
the underlying asset more highly, she would "bribe" the option holder 
not to exercise the option.so Each party to a liability rule dispute is si­
multaneously a potential buyer and a potential seller. By contrast, 
property rules create only one seller and one buyer; no alternating is 
possible. 
But what about transaction costs? Even if liability rules have the 
potential to generate more trades, this advantage may be lost in the 
presence of transaction costs. To overcome this challenge, Ayres and 
Talley modified traditional transaction cost analysis. They noted that 
in thin markets the main obstacle to private bargaining is not the cost 
of locating and assembling the affected parties, which preoccupied 
Calabresi and Melamed, but rather, strategic bargaining.s1 In such an 
environment, where price is not readily determinable, each negotiator 
has an incentive to posture in order to secure a larger share of the bar­
gaining surplus. Consequently, the challenge for legal rules is to facili­
tate exchange by countering the predisposition to bargain strategically. 
Liability rules accomplish just that. By dividing entitlements, liability 
rules put the bargainers in an "identity crisis," with neither of them 
knowing whether she would wind up buying or selling. Asking too 
much, or offering too little, runs the risk of the other party selecting to 
sell for the quoted price instead of buying, or buy for the quoted price 
instead of selling.s2 Moreover, dividing the entitlement lowers the 
stakes for each bargainer, thus further reducing the incentive to bar­
gain dishonestly.53 
48. That is, a "call option." 
49. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 47, at 1031. 
50. See id. at 1038. 
51. See id. at 1030; see also Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 
(1982) (pointing out that disagreements as to how to divide the contractual surplus may pre­
vent successful Coasean bargaining); John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Pri­
vate Information, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 46 (1993) {hypothesizing that differences in 
private information are a primary cause of bargaining delays). 
52. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 47, at 1030. This "identity crisis" is strongest when 
entitlements are divided evenly. See, e.g. , Peter Cramton et al., Dissolving a Partnership Effi­
ciently, 55 ECONOMETRICA 615 (1987). 
53. See Rose, Shadow of the Cathedral, supra note 19, at 2184. 
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. Finally, Ayres and Talley have illuminated the information­
revealing aspect of liability rules. They proposed that the values the 
parties place on the whole entitlement may be discerned from their 
bargaining tactics. Assume, for example, that the option holder seeks 
to exercise her option. A high-value right holder would offer to pay 
the option holder not to exercise. Conversely, a low-value right holder 
would not attempt to stave off the exercise of the option, and may 
even approach the option-holder with an offer to sell. Thus, the 
Solomonic bargaining generated by liability rules partitions the hold­
ers of the divided entitlement into higher- and lower-value bidders, 
thereby divulging private information and facilitating trade.54 
b. Kaplow and Shavell. A different refinement to the Calabresi­
Melamedian framework has been proposed by Kaplow and Shavell.55 
Like Ayres and Talley, Kaplow and Shaven have called for a more ex­
pansive use of liability rules, albeit for different reasons. Furthermore, 
unlike Ayres and Talley who disregarded property rules, Kaplow and 
Shavell redefined the proper role of property rules in protecting enti­
tlements. 
At the core of Kaplow and Shavell's analysis lie two analytical dis­
tinctions which enabled them to compai;tmentalize the universe of en­
titlement disputes into a two-by-two matrix. The first distinction is be­
tween "externalities disputes" and "possessory disputes." A 
paradigmatic example of the former is industrial pollution, or noise. A 
typical example of the latter is a dispute over an item of personal 
property, such as a laptop computer. The second, and more familiar, 
distinction is between high transaction cost and low transaction cost 
settings. 
Kaplow and Shaven proposed that property rules are superior to 
liability rules in the context of possessory disputes irrespective of 
· whether transaction costs are high or low. This is because liability rule 
protection of possessory interests raises two problems: reciprocal tak­
ings and sequential taking.56 If A's possession of her laptop computer 
is protected by a liability rule, and the damage amount is set too low,57 
B would take A's laptop and pay the damage award. This, in turn, 
would prompt A to take back the laptop and pay B, and so a vicious 
54. See id. at 2184-85; see also Ayres & Talley, supra note 47, at 1039-47. Ayres and 
Talley acknowledged that negotiators would continue to misrepresent their true valuations 
in the hope of extracting a larger share of the bargaining surplus. They pointed out, however, 
that the liability amount restricts the ability of the parties to exaggerate. Or, as they put it, 
the expected damage award "serves as both a ceiling to overstatements and a floor to under­
statements." Id. at 1046. 
55. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9. 
56. Id. at 722, 765-67. 
57. If the damage award is too high, the distinction between liability rule protection and 
property rule protection loses its significance. See id. at 724 (observing that "a liability rule 
with very high damages is equivalent to a property rule protection of victims"). 
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cycle of reciprocal takings would ensue. Even worse, other parties, 
such as, C and D, may choose to take the laptop and pay, spearhead­
ing an infinite series of sequential takings. Instead of negotiating in the 
shadow of liability rules, as Ayres and Talley would have them, the 
contending parties would repeatedly take from one another.58 
In externalities cases, the choice of legal rules depends on the 
magnitude of transaction costs. Reiterating Coase's main insight, 
Kaplow and Shaven conclude that when transaction costs are low, the 
choice of legal rule does not m.atter. In this instance, property rules 
and liability rules would perform equally well since parties can bargain 
to achieve the optimal allocation of resources. When transaction costs 
are high, liability rules have the edge. When private bargaining is im­
possible, the court must allocate the right to the higher value user. If 
the court chooses to employ property rule protection, it must know 
both the damage to the victim and the prevention cost to the polluter. 
By contrast, the use of liability rules requires the court to know only 
one variable: the damage to the victim. Once the court sets the liability 
amount correctly, the polluter, who knows the cost of prevention, has 
a choice to make. If the cost of prevention exceeds the damage 
amount, she would continue with the polluting activity and pay dam­
ages. If the cost of prevention is lower than the expected liability, she 
would invest in preventive measures and abate the pollution. Thus, 
liability rules minimize information costs. According to Kaplow and 
Shaven, it is for this reason that liability rules should be favored over 
property rules when transaction costs are high, and not because of the 
impossibility of bargaining, as Calabresi and Melamed suggested.59 
c. Krier and Schwab. The final challenge to the Calabresi­
Melamedian framework differs dramatically from the two previously 
discussed. In a marked departure from the conventional view among 
law and economics scholars, Krier and Schwab questioned the pre­
sumed superiority of liability rules in high transaction costs settings. 
They noted that the conventional view that liability rules outperform 
property rules when transacting is prohibitively costly rests on a tacit 
assumption that courts can assess damages with reasonable accuracy in 
such situations. Yet, following Polinsky,6() Krier and Schwab pointed 
out that this key assumption has never been substantiated.61 Krier and 
58. Ian Ayres and Jack Balkin, however, have pointed out that this problem could be 
avoided if each taking were accompanied by an incremental price increase. More generally, 
they note that liability rules are essentially truncated auctions. Thus, they propose that enti­
tlements be auctioned off between the contending parties with the highest bidder ultimately 
receiving the entitlement. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 25, at 707-716. 
59. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 719, 726-27; see also Rose, Shadow of the 
Cathedral, supra note 19, at 2191. 
60. See Polinsky, supra note 9, at 1111. 
61. See Krier & Schwab, The Cathedral in Another Light, supra note 37, at 453-54. 
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Schwab attributed this omission to the failure of scholars to recognize 
the existence of assessment costs - the transaction costs of the judi­
cial process - and, more generally, to engage in comparative institu­
tional analysis.62 
In addressing these omissions, Krier and Schwab found that the 
presumed superiority of liability rules in high transaction costs settings 
is illusory. Krier and Schwab contended that although private bar­
gaining over damages is costly when transaction costs are high, the 
cost of judicial assessment of damages may be higher still. Hence, it is 
impossible to determine in the abstract which mode is superior.63 
Moreover, they suggested that there is a positive correlation between 
factors that give rise to high transaction costs and those creating high 
assessment costs.64 For example, bargaining is likely to be ineffective 
in disputes involving multiple parties and in bilateral monopoly cases. 
But so is judicial assessment of damages. Consider, for example, the 
case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 65 In Boomer, the presence of 
multiple victims, which gave rise to high transaction costs and poten­
tial holdout problems, thwarted the possibility of a voluntary agree­
ment between the cement plant and the residents. The same fact, 
however, made judicial determination of damages extremely difficult.66 
This example may be generalized: the involvement of multiple parties 
and the lack of readily ascertainable market prices make accurate as­
sessment of damage virtually impossible.67 Thus, the very factors that 
undermine efficient bargaining also frustrate the ability of courts to 
determine damages with reasonable precision. 
Furthermore, because courts routinely grant objective damages 
and ignore subjective, or idiosyncratic, harms, damage awards tend to 
be undercompensatory; victims' losses are rarely fully redressed in liti­
gation.68 At the end of the day, therefore, Krier and Schwab posit that 
there is no inherent reason to assume that liability rules would better 
enhance economic efficiency when transaction costs are high.69 
62. See id. at 454, 475-77. 
63. See id. at 454-55. 
64. See id. at 459-61. 
65. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
66. For discussion, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 14-28 (1994) (discussing the as­
sessment problem in the Boomer case); Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Effi­
ciency, and Nuisance Law, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF JOHN E. CRIBBET 7, 11-12 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1989) (pointing out 
that Atlantic's total liability "ultimately came to $710,000, some four times the amount men­
tioned in the Court of Appeals decision denying injunctive relief'). 
67. See Krier & Schwab, The Cathedral in Another Light, supra note 37, at 460-62. 
68. See id. at 457-59. 
69. It bears emphasis, however, that Krier and Schwab have not positively shown that 
property rules would outperform liability rules in high-transaction-costs settings. Their 
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2. Descriptive Challenges 
a. Put Protection. Combining the Calabresi-Melamedian frame­
work with option theory, several scholars have noticed an interesting 
extension to Calabresi and Melamed's analysis of liability rules. Spe­
cifically, they observed that while Calabresi and Melamed treated li­
ability rules strictly as call options, i.e., options to "buy" entitlements 
from their holders, entitlements may also be protected with put op­
tions. 70 The mirror image of calls, put options bestow upon the enti­
tlement holder the power to sell the entitlement to the other party to 
the dispute, for example the polluter, for a certain exercise price. 
Hence, it can be said that put option protection grants to "the initial 
entitlement holder everything that she would have under a property 
rule plus a put option."71 
The choice between "calls" and "puts" has important distributional 
consequences. Puts increase the expected payoff of the entitlement 
holder relative to calls and standard property rule protection.72 
Moreover, put option protection reduces the risk to which entitlement 
analysis only suggests that Calabresi and Melamed's conclusion that liability rules better en­
hance efficiency in the face of high transaction costs may be incorrect due to Calabresi and 
Melamed's omission of comparative institutional analysis. 
70. See, e.g. , Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 798 
(1998) (noting that. a put option, or "forced purchase" rule, gives the entitlement holder the 
option to force the nonentitlement holder to purchase); Madeline Morris, The Structure of 
Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854-56 (1993) (describing put options as examples of 
reverse liability rules in which the entitlement holder has the right to a forced compensated 
transfer); cf. Ayres & Balkin, supra note 25 (describing various mechanisms for auctioning 
put options). Bt11 see Richard A. Epstein, Protecting Property Rights with Legal Remedies: A 
Common Sense Reply to Professor Ayres, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 833 (1998) (challenging the 
efforts of Ian Ayres and others to apply financial economics to elaborate on Calabresi and 
Melamed's original two-by-two matrix). 
71. See Ayres, supra note 70, at 799. Correspondingly, the nonentitlement holder against 
whom the put option may be exercised has less than nothing, since she may be forced to buy 
an entitlement against her will. Id. 
72. See id. at 804-13. Ayres points out that in addition to changing the division of the 
bargaining surplus between the parties, put protection also affects the bid/ask difference. He 
notes that "[f]or both cognitive and wealth effects reasons, it is often the case that a particu­
lar person will demand a higher price when selling an entitlement than she would be willing 
to pay if forced to buy." Id. at 809-10; see also Levmore, supra note 4, at 2166 (describing the 
offer-asking differential, or "endowment effect"). 
On the "endowment effect," see generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests 
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (concluding 
that endowment effects are not easily altered by experience); Daniel Kahneman et al., The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991) 
(defining the "endowment effect" as a behavior in which "people often demand much more 
to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it"); Richard Thaler, 
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1980) (exam­
ining ways in which consumers deviate from rational economic models). On the impact of 
the endowment effect on legal policymaking, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, 
Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 59 (1993); Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: To­
ward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1994). 
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holders are exposed. Call options vest the power to exercise in the 
nonentitlement holder. Put options, by contrast, grant the decision­
making power to the entitlement holder. Consequently, put option 
protection provides the greatest incentive to property owners to invest 
in their assets, and the strongest deterrent to potential takers.73 
Although put option protection is an important theoretical possi­
bility, it is rarely used in reality.74 Richard Epstein, for example, sug­
gested that puts "are never imposed as a matter of law on strangers, 
but are the outgrowth of consensual transactions over organized mar­
kets. "75 In response to this claim, Ian Ayres showed that the reach of 
put option protection extends to certain nonconsensual settings, such 
as conversion, and trespass disputes. Even Ayres, however, conceded 
Epstein's basic point: that the common law does not employ puts in 
rem, but rather, as limited in personam rights in certain bilateral mo­
nopoly situations.76 
b. "Startle" or "Startling" Rules.77 Aside from the possibility of put 
option protection, several scholars have observed various other exten­
sions to the Calabresi-Melamedian four rule framework. The scholarly 
interest in the possibility of additional rules has been rekindled by 
Krier and Schwab's "discovery" of a new rule, which they entitled 
"rule 5."78 Krier and Schwab proposed that in certain instances the 
transgressor should be permitted to choose to abate the tortious activ­
ity and collect the victim's gains occasioned by this decision. Under 
this rule, A, who causes a nuisance to B, gets the discretion to stop at 
73. See Ayres, supra note 70, at 807. 
74. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of 
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997) (noting that certain financial arrangements, 
such as puts, are "common enough in financial markets, but are rarely encountered in the 
world of legally created remedies"). Even Morris, who was the first to observe the possibility 
of put option protection, found only two real world examples of this type of protection: 
"[g]un buy-out offers by police department, and soft drink container deposit redemption 
laws." See Morris, supra note 70, at 855. 
75. Epstein, supra note 74, at 2093. 
76. See Ayres, supra note 70, at 814 n.63. It should be noted that some of the put protec­
tion examples identified by Ayres do not clearly fall under his own definition of the term. 
For instance, Ayres characterizes the famous case of Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895), as 
granting the plaintiffs, the victims of the encroachment, put option protection. In fact, the 
court merely permitted the plaintiff to choose between injunction and damages, and the 
plaintiff ultimately preferred the former, i.e., property rule protection. Since true put option 
protection would give the plaintiffs more than a simple property rule, the plaintiffs' choice 
seems quite odd. It is possible, then, that the court was not offering the plaintiff put option 
protection, but rather, a choice between property rule protection and a call option protec­
tion to the defendant-transgressor. This is not to say that Ayres' construction of the case is 
necessarily incorrect. However, without knowing what exactly the damage award was in this 
case, it is impossible to say with certainty that the court employed put option protection. 
77. The term "startling rule" owes its origin to Levmore. 
78. See Krier & Schwab, The Cathedral in Another Light, supra note 37, at 470-71. It is 
widely agreed that the original startling rule was Calabresi and Melamed's rule 4. See 
Levmore, supra note 4, at 2150. 
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her choice, and collect damages from B in the amount of the benefit B 
receives as a consequence or to continue the nuisance and receive 
nothing.79 Krier and Schwab's proposal reportedly "infuriated [certain 
scholars] who found it too unusual to be of note."80 But it captivated 
the minds of most others,81 despite the fact that Krier and Schwab 
were unable to find any judicial authority employing or foreshadowing 
their insight, and the obvious risk of strategic abuse of this remedy by 
tortfeasors.82 Importantly, Krier and Schwab's insight, debatable as it 
might be, demonstrated that other rules may be hiding in the wings of 
Calabresi and Melamed's four basic rules. 
Indeed, three years later, Saul Levmore, in an analytical tour de 
force, derived as many as sixteen variants from Calabresi and 
Melamed's original four.83 To accomplish this feat, Levmore divided 
the four basic rules according to various familiar legal distinctions. For 
example, in the context of liability rules, Levmore proposed that a 
court might order compensation only if the injurer was negligent, but 
not otherwise.84 Furthermore, drawing on the distinction between torts 
and unjust enrichment, Levmore noted that in determining the proper 
compensation award, a court could choose between the victim's loss 
and the injurer's gain.85 Levmore also observed that instead of award­
ing compensation for both past and future injuries, a court may com­
pensate the victim for either past or future injuries.86 In the same vein, 
in the context of property rules, a court may award the victim an in­
junction, but deny her damages for past injuries. Or, if the court 
wishes to increase the victim's compensation, it may enjoin the harm­
ful activity and award the victim the injurer's past gain. 
Inspired by the unveiling of rule 5, Levmore also sought to uncover 
several "startling rules" of his own. Ultimately, Levmore found one 
such rule, which he dubbed "Rule 5CE."87 Drawing on rule 5, 
Levmore proposed a rule that would permit the injurer to continue 
79. Ian Ayres correctly noted that rule 5 is essentially an example of put option protec-
tion. See Ayres, supra note 70, at 801. 
80. Levmore, supra note 4, at 2150. 
81. See id. 
82. See Levmore, supra note 4, at 2161 (noting that "[i]f A knew that a judge would re­
spond to any complaint by B with this rule 5, then A would have a perverse incentive to cre­
ate nuisances in order to collect from B"). 
83. A full review of all of Levmore's variants is beyond the scope of this Article. For a 
table summarizing the sixteen different rules, see Levmore, supra note 4, at 2173. 
84. Id. at 2156. In a different variant, Levmore proposed that if the injurer was not neg­
ligent she would share in the victim's loss if they both belong to the same community. Id. at 
2159. 
85. Id. at 2157. 
86. Id. at 2159. 
87. Id. at 2162. 
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with the harmful activity, but would force her to pay all her gains from 
choosing to do so to the victim.88 However, Levmore himself admitted 
that "it may be hard to see why Rule 5 or 5CE would ever be selected 
[by a court]."89 
c. Summary and Evaluation. The Cathedral and its progeny have 
had a profound impact on entitlement theory as well as our under­
standing of the legal system as a whole. The focus on transaction costs, 
the defining characteristic of this body of literature, has transformed 
traditional understandings of property, contract, and tort. Several 
changes are worth noting. 
First, the focus on transacting has reduced the status of property 
rights from near-absolute rights that denote individual autonomy and 
security to fungible bargaining chips. From a right that granted to its 
holder the power to exclude others,90 property has become no more 
than a contractual lever. And, from a right that could only in rare 
cases be taken for a public use,91 property has become an up-for-grabs 
right, open to all potential takers. The familiar "no-trespassing" sign 
was replaced with an "all welcome" one. 
Second, the entitlement literature has largely changed the internal 
hierarchy between property and contract. Traditionally, property was 
deemed a keynote right,92 and contract as a subservient right, designed 
to enable property owners to transfer their property. The right to 
transfer, represented by contract, was just one stick in the bundle of 
rights property confers upon its holder.93 The entitlement literature 
has turned this relationship around, placing contract at the core of our 
legal system, and property at the fringes. Under the new conceptuali­
zation, property merely facilitates contracting by defining the initial 
bargaining positions of the parties. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 2168. 
90. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (" '[T]he right to 
exclude others' is 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.' "); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 
NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (2000) (positing that "the right to exclude others is more than just 
'one of the most essential' constituents of property - it is the sine qua non"). 
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation."). 
92. See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 
(1999) [hereinafter Rose, Keystone Right] (reviewing and critically examining the various 
sources of the view of property as a keynote right). 
93. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 40-50 (1990) (suggesting that 
the right to transfer the "stick" distinguishes property rights from personal rights); J.E. Pen­
ner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 747 (arguing that 
"the right to transfer property is an inherent feature of property rights"); cf. Merrill & Smith, 
supra note 9, at 365 (observing that for some writers influenced by the legal realism of the 
1 920s and 1930s, "the bundle-of-rights concept simply meant that property could be reduced 
to recognizable collections of functional attributes, such as the right . . .  to transfer"). 
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Third, the economic analysis of entitlements has stripped property 
of one of its defining characteristics, its in rem nature.94 By contrast to 
in personam contractual rights that are binding only on the parties to 
the contract, property rights are binding upon the rest of the world.95 
Yet, owing to the tendency to model disputes as two party conflicts, 
the economic literature on entitlements has obliterated this important 
difference. As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have observed, "most 
modern economic accounts endow property with no distinctive charac­
ter at all." Property rights are "simply . . .  little empty boxes filled with 
a miscellany of use rights that operate in the background of a world 
consisting of nothing but in personam obligations."96 
Fourth, the virtually exclusive focus on facilitating transactions has 
pushed to the corner the traditional utilitarian justifications of prop­
erty, most notably the need to incentivize owners to invest in re­
sources.97 For this reason, property regimes overwhelmingly employ 
property rules as the default regime.98 As Carol Rose explained, this 
property rule favoritism is not accidental. Strong, undivided, and 
sharply defined property rights not only facilitate contracting but also 
"encourage individual investment, planning and effort" by giving ac­
tors "a clearer sense of what they are getting."99 Moreover, the trans­
actional focus has marginalized another key role of property law -
94. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 360 (noting that "(p]roperty rights historically have 
been regarded as in rem"); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract 
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 777 (2001) (noting that "[p]roperty rights are in rem -
they bind the 'rest of the world' "). 
95. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi­
cial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) (discussing the difference between in personam 
rights, which avail against one or a few persons, and in rem rights, which avail against a large 
and indefinite class of people). 
96. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 385. 
97. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (4th ed. 1882) (positing 
that property is the basis of an expectation of advantages). Examples of modern law and 
economics scholars of this view include: RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
(4th ed. 1998), JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 53 (4th ed. 1998) (noting 
that "[u]tilitarian theory is, without doubt, the dominant view of property today . . . espe­
cially among those working in law and economics"); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (providing a utilitarian account of the emer­
gence of property rights); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1 315 (1 993) 
(comparing private and group land ownership, and noting that a change in land regimes is 
efficient when it reduces the sum of transaction costs and deadweight losses); and Rose, 
Shadow of the Cathedral, supra note 19, at 2182, 2187. 
98. See Rose, Shadow of the Cathedral, supra note 1 9, at 2187; Epstein, supra note 74, at 
2096-2105 (discussing the dominance of property rules in property law). 
99. Rose, Shadow of the Cathedral, supra note 19, at 2187. 
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striking the balance between exclusivity and access,100 and in some 
cases, between monopoly and competition.101 
Finally, Calabresi and Melamed's call to consider distributive and 
other justice considerations in determining the allocation of entitle­
ments has been all but ignored by subsequent law and economics 
scholars. Although Calabresi and Melamed put the various considera­
tions on equal footing, economic efficiency somehow eclipsed the two 
other values. 
II. ENTER PLIABILITY RULES 
In this Part, we introduce the concept of pliability rules.102 Meta­
phorically speaking, Calabresi and Melamed viewed the law as a 
three-level structure, with inalienability rules at the ground level, 
property rules at the first floor, and liability rules at the second. While 
we adopt Calabresi and Melamed's three basic categories, we show 
that their metaphor is incomplete. It fails to capture the dynamism of 
the legal system, which allows for the changing of entitlements over 
time. In other words, it neglects to account for connections within the 
structure and the ability to move around in it. We propose that 
pliability rules should be viewed as the stairways between the floors, 
and the corridors and doorways connecting rooms on those floors. In 
other words, we contend that the set of entitlements described by the 
metaphor should include not only the rule in isolation, but also their 
100. See, e.g., Laura Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 129, 144-
45 (1991) (positing that property embodies an inherent tension between the individual and 
the collective.); cf Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 
YALE L.J. 283, 364 (1996) (suggesting, in the context of copyright, that the challenge facing 
decisionmakers is to structure the law so that it strikes a "careful balance between exclusivity 
and access"). 
101. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1989); cf J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: 
Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 867 
(1989) (suggesting that progress in international intellectual property relations has been 
based "on a process of consensus that enabled all participants to determine the desired bal­
ance between monopoly and competition"); Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: 
Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 11 29, 1171 n.141 (2001) (noting, in the intellec­
tual property context, that "utilitarianism seeks to balance creators' incentives against the 
public right of access, providing monopoly incentives only to the extent necessary to induce 
creation"). 
102. As Ian Ayres cautioned, originality is tricky to claim. Indeed, it is possible that 
Calabresi and Melamed saw the possibility of mixing property and liability rule protection. It 
is likely that Levmore saw this option, but never developed it, when he mentioned the possi­
bility of less than perfect property rule protection. And clearly, Merrill noticed, and even 
discussed, the possibility of incorporating a similar mode of protection into the doctrines of 
adverse possession and prescriptive easements. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1122 (1984). However, Merrill's 
discussion was limited to that context, and was primarily normative. Merrill never went be­
yond adverse possession. He did not explore the descriptive prevalence of pliability rules in 
other legal areas, nor did he propose the use of pliability rules in other settings. 
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interconnections. Calabresi and Melamed's model is static; ours is dy­
namic. 
Our three-fold project in this Part is to demonstrate the conceptual 
distinctiveness of pliability rules, show the descriptive pervasiveness of 
such rules, and to expound the various goals pliability rule protection 
serves. Our conceptual discussion focuses on demonstrating the dis­
tinctiveness of the category of pliability rules, and the importance of 
pliability rules for extending Calabresi and Melamed's analysis. 
As should be clear by the large number of examples presented in 
this Part, we contend that lawmakers have preceded the academy to 
pliability rules; pliability rules are already widely used. Our descriptive 
exposition covers various legal areas, with a major focus on property 
and intellectual property law, as well as antitrust law and corporate 
law. We show that in certain instances pliability rules enhance eco­
nomic efficiency, while in others they promote fairness and distribu­
tive concerns. 
Our normative aim here is to show that, due to their amalgamated 
nature, pliability rules provide a unique policy tool for a variety of cir­
cumstances, such as the need to accommodate competing societal in­
terests such as efficiency and equity, and monopoly power and compe­
tition. By combining property and liability rule protection, pliability 
rules merge the respective strengths of the two modalities. We gener­
alize our normative discussion in the next Part; here, our aim is to 
show the gains achieved by each of the examples of pliability rule we 
cite. 
A. Property + Liability = Pliability 
1. Pliability and Grue 
Pliability rules are amalgamated rules. They combine their familiar 
cousins - property rules and liability rules - in numerous combina­
tions. Among the many legal fields employing pliability rules are cor­
porate law, intellectual property, eminent domain, and antitrust, as 
well as several areas of law not discussed in this Part, such as bank­
ruptcy. However, pliability rules are much more than a rearrangement 
of familiar materials. 
To illustrate the importance of pliability rules, we turn to an anal­
ogy provided by the philosopher Nelson Goodman. In his Fact, Fiction 
and Forecast, Goodman sought to illustrate a problem with inductive 
reasoning by hypothesizing an imaginary color called "grue."103 An 
item that is colored "grue" looks green to anyone who observes it 
prior to a given time - for example, the year 2003. Thereafter, the 
grue item appears blue. Goodman notes that before the year 2003, 
103. NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST 74 et seq. (2d ed. 1965). 
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anyone exammmg the grue-colored item would be unable to tell 
whether she was looking at something that was green or something 
that was grue. Anyone hearing an item described as "green" before 
2003, or as "blue" afterwards, would not know whether the described 
item were actually green or blue, on the one hand, or grue, on the 
other. This, says Goodman, demonstrates a characteristic failure of in­
duction. While green, blue and grue are all ontologically distinct -
each has its own distinct color characteristic - the observer can never 
induce whether she has seen grue or either green or blue. Induction, 
notes Goodman, fails to distinguish between items that appear the 
same, but are ontologically different. 
Pliability rules are distinct from property and liability rules, as grue 
is from green and blue. While a pliability rule may appear as a prop­
erty or liability rule at any given point in time, it is nevertheless onto­
logically distinct. Unlike a property or liability rule, a pliability rule 
contains within itself its own conditions for change. A person who ob­
serves property rule or liability rule protection at a given point in time, 
and assumes that the property rule or liability rule protection encap­
sulates the true legal protection of an object, may be making a critical 
error. If the entitlement holder actually enjoys pliability rule protec­
tion over the object, describing the protection as property rule or li­
ability rule protection would constitute an ontological error. In this 
sense, a pliability analysis is thus the opposite of what Louis Kaplow 
labeled a "transitional" analysis - the analysis of how entitlements 
should be treated in the face of "the existence of uncertainty con­
cerning [a J future government policy [transition] prior to the govern­
ment action."104 Pliability rules provide entitlement holders with cer­
tainty concerning future changes in the rules protecting their 
entitlements, and, therefore, a truer appreciation of the nature of pro­
tection they enjoy at present. 
Importantly, given that pliability rules have distinct properties and 
a unique identity and course, they create a different set of incentives. 
Property rules are generally thought to encourage greater investment 
than liability rules, since the entitlement holder may prevent involun­
tary loss of the object. Pliability rules fall somewhere in the middle, 
depending on the particular combination of property rules and liability 
rules. Also, certain pliability rules offer the additional advantage of 
self-regulation as they allow the entitlement holder to affect the na­
ture of the protection she enjoys. We illustrate these important fea­
tures of pliability rules in the discussion and examples later in this 
Part. 
Nelson Goodman's discussion of grue provides a metaphor for an­
other key feature of our analysis of pliability rules. Goodman does not 
104. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 
512 (1986). 
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suffice with grue's ontological distinctiveness; ultimately, Goodman 
rejects the importance of grue on pragmatic grounds, noting that grue 
is not a significant category in the real world. Thus, for the existence of 
pliability rules to be noteworthy, such rules must have some practical 
significance, as well as ontological identity. Our discussion in this Part 
shows the pervasiveness of pliability rules in the legal world, rendering 
pliability rules a more valuable category of analysis than grue. 
Indeed, as our discussion shows, pliability rules are so ubiquitous 
in our legal regime that every entitlement can be viewed, in one sense 
or another, as falling under the protection of pliability rules, rather 
than property or liability rules. This, too, requires a practical ap­
proach. Property rules, liability rules, and pliability rules are not di­
vorced from the legal context in which they arise. In some cases, the 
legal contingency that gives rise to a change in legal protection may be 
so remote that it may be safely ignored for most purposes. Pure prop­
erty or liability rules are the more useful framework for examining the 
entitlement in such instances. 
2. Pliability and Calabresi and Melamed 
The role of pliability rules can also be illustrated in reference to 
Calabresi and Melamed's famous table of the four basic types of prop­
erty and liability rules. Their table omitted inalienability rules. The ta­
ble is meant to illustrate four possible responses to claims of nuisance. 
The typical case underlying each cell in the table involves a home­
owner suing a nearby polluter. In cell one, the plaintiff homeowner 
enjoys property rule protection and is entitled to a court order en­
joining the polluting activity. In cell two, the plaintiff homeowner re­
ceives liability rule protection. The polluter may continue her activi­
ties but must pay the homeowner for damages. In cell three, the 
defendant polluter enjoys property rule protection. The polluter may 
continue the activities, and the homeowner receives no relief. Cell 
four involves liability rule protection for the defendant. The polluter 
must cease her polluting activities, but the plaintiff homeowner must 
pay the defendant polluter for the resulting damages. 
The table below illustrates these possibilities, with cases in which 
courts may be deemed to have employed the relevant type of protec­
tion. 
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TABLE 1: PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES 
1. Property Rule (Plaintiff) 2. Liability Rule (Plaintiff) 
Department of Health & Mental Boomer v. Atlantic Cement101 
Hygiene v. Galaxy Chemical Co.105; 
Ensign v. Walls106 
3. Property Rule (Defendant) 4. Liability Rule (Defendant) 
Francisco v. Department of Spur Industries Inc. v. Dell E. 
Institutions & Agencies108; Rose v. Webb Development Co.U0  
Socony Vacuum Corp. 109 
As we noted in the last Part, the Calebresi-Melamedian four-cell 
table has been the launching pad for many analyses of property and 
liability rules. In that vein, we illustrate the place of pliability rules 
within the traditional four-cell table. As their name implies, pliability 
rules are amalgamated rules that combine property and liability rule 
protection. Under pliability rule protection, the entitlement holder ini­
tially receives one type of rule protection - property or liability -
and then upon the occurrence of a certain contingency, the nature of 
the protection changes to another kind of rule protection. Sometimes, 
pliability rules involve transfer of the entitlement itself. 
The next table adds the possibility of pliability rules, illustrated by 
the arrows. As the table demonstrates, pliability rules involve either a 
simultaneous rule, in which more than one of the rules applies at the 
same time, or, more commonly, a changing rule, in which protection 
begins with one of the four types of ordinary Calabresi-Melamedian 
property and liability rules, and then, upon a specified event, changes 
to another of the four types of rules. Although there is no limit on the 
number of possible pliability rules, we illustrate in the chart, only the 
six prototypical pliability rules that we describe in this Part. 
105. 1 ENVIR. REP. 1660 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1970) (enjoining chemical smells). 
106. 34 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. 1948) (enjoining raising a dog in residential neighborhood). 
107. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (ruling that avoidance of injunction was conditioned on 
payment of permanent damages to plaintiffs). 
108. 180 A. 843 (N.J. Ch. 1935) (holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to enjoin noise 
and odors of adjacent sanitarium). 
109. 173 A. 627 (R.I. 1934) (finding that absent negligence, pollution of percolating wa­
ters was not enjoinable ). 
1 10. 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (enjoining the operator of a feedlot from continuing its 
operation, but ordering that a developer representing residents indemnify the tortfeasor for 
the cost of moving or shutting down). 
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TABLE 2: PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND PLIABILITY 
RULES 
1. Property Rule (Plaintiff) 
Classic Pliability 
Title 
Shifting 
la I tty 
(adverse 
possession) 
3. Property Rule (Defendant) 
2. Liability Rule (Plaintiff) 
4. Liability Rule (Defendant) 
As the table demonstrates, we focus our discussion on six proto­
types of pliability rules that are common in existing law. 
The first set of pliability rules involves property rules that are 
transformed into liability rules - "classic pliability rules" under our 
terminology. The legal protection of post-freeze-out minority share­
holders provides an example of such classic pliability rule protection. 
The second set comprises the particular variety of pliability rules 
that we call "zero order pliability rules" - property rules that become 
liability rules where the compensation for breach of the rule is zero. 
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An example of a zero order pliability rule is copyright protection, un­
der which the author receives a property right for her life plus seventy 
years, and thereafter anybody can use the copyrighted expression free 
of charge. 
As a third set of prototypical pliability rules, we tum to the case of 
"simultaneous pliability rules," in which the same entitlement holder 
holds one type of rule protection with respect to some potential users, 
but a different type of rule protection with respect to other users. For 
example, the fair use doctrine in copyright law reduces the usual prop­
erty rule protection to zero order liability protection where the use of 
the copyright entitlement constitutes a "fair use."11 1 
The fourth set includes "loperty rules," in which initial liability rule 
protection is transformed into property rule protection. The transfor­
mation of cattle-feeding rights resulting from fencing pasture in a 
"fencing-out" legal regime provides an example of a loperty rule. 
The fifth set of pliability rules we examine consists of "title shifting 
pliability rules," i.e., rules that transform property rule protection in 
the hands of one entitlement holder into property rule protection in 
the hands of another entitlement holder. Adverse possession provides 
the classic example of this type of pliability rule. 
Finally, we examine the case of "multiple stage pliability rules," in 
which rule protection is changed more than once. For example, we ob­
serve that eminent domain can be viewed as property rule protection 
followed by liability rule protection in the hands of the original owner, 
and then property rule protection in the hands of the subsequent enti­
tlement holder. 
B. Classic Pliability Rules 
Classic pliability rules, as we noted, involve the transformation of 
an entitlement from property rule to liability rule protection. In cases 
involving classic pliability rules, property rules provide the baseline 
protection in order to advance efficient allocation of resources. By 
creating in rem rights in resources, property rules reduce the cost of 
defending the item against potential takers, allowing owners to invest 
optimally in the item's use. Where exogenous transaction costs are 
low, the in rem protection comes at low cost, since the object will still 
gravitate to the highest value user. Moreover, property rights them­
selves lower transaction costs and facilitate exchange by reducing the 
cost of defining ownership and usage rights iri objects. 
However, classic pliability rules also take into account the many 
instances in which the default property rule protection becomes ineffi­
cient or unfair. Classic pliability rules, by defining the triggering event 
111. Admittedly, in framing the issue in this way, we treat users as intrinsically wedded 
to certain types of uses, which blurs the important distinction between uses and users. 
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that alters protection from property to liability rule, retains the advan­
tages of baseline property rule protection, while creating the flexibility 
to adapt to changing circumstances. 
We introduce the category with an examination qf the most 
straightforward example: the rights of minority shareholders in the af­
termath of mergers and acquisitions. 
1. Mergers and Acquisitions 
Ordinarily, shareholders in a corporation enjoy property rule pro­
tection over their shares. Subject to reporting and alienability restric­
tions established by law, shareholders may freely sell or transfer their 
shares, and shares may not be appropriated by nonowners without the 
owner's consent.1 12 However, most types of corporate decisions do not 
require unanimous assent. This category includes key decisions such as 
mergers or freeze-out takeovers that force minority shareholders to 
surrender their shares in exchange for compensation determined by 
the corporation.113 Generally, in such cases, state law entitles minority 
shareholders to petition for court review of the adequacy of the com­
pensation. This right to demand review is termed an appraisal right.114 
112. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 92 (6th ed. 1992) (noting that "shares of corporate stock are freely trans­
ferable"). Cary and Eisenberg also observe that under the U.C.C., a stock certificate is a ne­
gotiable instrument. See id. at 92 n.4 (citing U.C.C. §§ 8-102, 8-105(1)). Therefore, "a trans­
fer to a holder in due course cuts off most claims against the transferee." Id. 
113. Compare Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (holding that ap­
praisal is the only available remedy for minority shareholders in a cash-out merger, and 
noting that "[flair price obviously requires consideration of all relevant factors involving the 
value of a company"), with Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp. , 498 A.2d 1099, 1106, 
1107-08 (Del. 1985) (holding that appraisal is not an exclusive remedy when the defendant 
engaged in faithless acts that were reasonably related to and have a substantial impact upon 
the price offered in a freeze-out merger). 
114. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1167 
(3d ed. 1989) (defining "dissenters' appraisal right" as the right of "[s]hareholders who dis­
sent from a corporate merger and, in most states, shareholders who dissent from the sale of 
all or substantially all of their corporation's assets . . .  to require the corporation to purchase 
their shares at a judicially determined price"). 
For a sample of statutes that provide for dissenters' appraisal rights, see CAL. CORP. 
CODE §§ 17600-17613 (West 1999) (providing for dissenters' rights with regard to certain 
reorganizations or mergers of limited liability corporations); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 608.4381(4)(d) (West 1999) (referring to offers required in connection with dissenters' 
rights); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1005 (McKinney 1994) (providing for payments to dissent­
ing members in the case of certain mergers or consolidations); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1705.40 (Anderson 1998) (outlining members' entitlement to relief as dissenting members). 
Many corporations statutes lack similar protections, notwithstanding the widespread 
provision of appraisal rights for minority owners in corporations. See Joel Seligman, 
Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 831-32 & n.11 (1984) (re­
porting that all fifty states and the District of Columbia provide appraisal rights in case of a 
corporate merger or consolidation); see also Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-Out Rights, Fiduci­
ary Duties, and Dissolution Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a 
Liability Company?, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 416-17 (2001). For example, some limited 
liability corporations statutes do not provide for dissenters' rights in the case of certain 
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Consider the case of the classic tender offer accompanied by a 
freeze-out. The target corporation is a publicly held corporation with, 
let us say, 100,000 outstanding shares. An acquiring corporation de­
sires to purchase and incorporate the business of the target corpora­
tion into its own. To this end, the acquirer issues a tender offer for the 
purchase of 50,001 of the target's shares. Following the success of the 
tender offer, the acquirer intends to use the 50,001 shares to cause the 
target to vote to merge itself into the acquirer. Under the terms of the 
merger deal, the target will sell all its assets,to the acquirer for cash, 
and then cease to exist as an independent corporation. Since minority 
shareholders in the target will be forced to receive cash in exchange 
for their shares in the dissolving corporation, the nature of their enti­
tlement will be transformed from property rule protection into liability 
rule protection. If displeased with the amount of compensation set by 
the majority {the acquirer's 50,001 shares), the minority shareholders 
may seek judicial appraisal of the value of their shares in the target. 
Either way, the minority shareholders lack the ability to veto the 
transfer of their assets and must make do with a third party determina­
tion of the amount they will receive. 
Minority share ownership in the face of majoritarian corporate 
decisionmaking is therefore a pliability entitlement: in most cases, a 
share is a property interest entitled to property rule protection, but the 
adoption of certain corporate decisions alters the nature of the share­
holder's interest in his or her shares. The provision in state law re­
quiring majority d�cisions to engage in a merger, freeze-out takeover 
or the like, should therefore be viewed as creating a classic pliability 
rule. 
The use of a pliability rule in this case is justifiable on grounds of 
both fairness and efficiency. The property rule baseline, by empower­
ing shareholders to dispose of their shares as they please, induces in­
vestment in the stock market, and allows individuals to plan ahead. 
Since ordinary share trading on the market is relatively cheap, markets 
are liquid, and there is no inherent reason to assume that non-holding 
investors value shares more highly than existing shareholders, prop­
erty rule protection is the optimal means for ensuring that shares are 
efficiently allocated. 
· 
However, in scenarios involving transfer of corporate control, 
property rule protection is unduly cumbersome. Obtaining unanimous 
consent is likely to be prohibitively costly. Additionally, strategic 
holdouts may bar such transactions altogether. Under a unanimous 
consent rule, each shareholder will find it in her interest to holdout in 
order to increase her expected payoff.115 Finally, in the absence of stra-
mergers or acquisitions, and few corporations statutes provide an equitable dissolution or 
buy-out remedy in the case of illegality or fraud. Id. at 417. 
115. See Zohar Goshen, Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law, 2 THEORETICAL 
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tegic behavior, majority decisions are the best mechanism for maxi­
mizing the wealth of the shareholders as a group. Thus, to ensure the 
efficient operation of the market for corporate control, corporate law 
replaces the property rule baseline with a liability rule triggered by 
majority decisions. 
While a pliability rule in this context is superior to both unchang­
ing property and liability rule protection, it still leaves open the possi­
bility of majority abuse in the liability phase. In cases of freeze-out 
takeovers, for example, majority shareholders may use their power to 
divest minority shareholders of their assets to transfer value from the 
minority to the majority. Majority decisions make minorities vulner­
able to unfair asset substitution, in which the majority uses a merger or 
takeover to substitute one set of assets underlying the share for an­
other, less valuable set.116 The law thus ensures the shareholders' right 
to adequate compensation in the liability stage of the pliability rule by 
means of an appraisal right.117 
INQUIRIES L. 815, 820 (2001) (explaining the holdout problem with the example of a corpo­
ration that asks for its bondholders' consent to an interest rate decrease to ease the corpora­
tion's debt burden - a decision requiring the unanimous consent of all the bondholders: 
"Despite the fact that this decrease in the interest rate may be in the best interests of all the 
bondholders, an individual bondholder may vote strategically against the change, withhold­
ing her consent until she is paid a higher price for her support."). 
116. Modern explanations of the importance of appraisal rights tend to focus on reduc­
ing the distortive effects of two-tier tender offers. See, e.g. , Daniel Fischel, The Appraisal 
Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875, 879 (1983) (arguing that ap­
praisal rights alleviate the prisoner's dilemma in the case of a two-tier tender offer); Hideki 
Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA 
L. REV. 429, 463-469 (1985) (contemplating the theoretical potential of appraisal rights as a 
general monitoring tool against management which reduces the ex ante costs of the agency 
relationship). These explanations of the importance of appraisal rights also tend to focus on 
ensuring minority shareholders a "fair share" of value created in the corporate change. See 
Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 336 (1974) (arguing that in the case of a two-tier tender offer, "the 
function of a fairness standard should primarily be one of preventing deception"); Council of 
the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association, The Proposed 
Delaware Takeover Statute: A Report to the Delaware General Assembly 3 (1988) (noting 
that a potential bidder is able to "take over the company without the approval of the board, 
sell the assets, and dividend out the proceeds and have each stockholder receive his fair 
share of its assets"), rather than "asset substitution." For further explanation, see also Peter 
V. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1121 (1998); Paul Ma­
honey & Mark Weinstein, The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums, 1 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 239 (1999); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy and How 
Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613 (1998). 
117. Under the stock market exception, many appraisal statutes do not apply to widely 
held public corporations. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(l) (1991). 
Other legal mechanisms exist to protect minority shareholders, especially in the close 
corporation context. For example, Delaware permits the shareholders of a close corporation 
to include in the certificate of incorporation a provision allowing dissolution at the request of 
any shareholder. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (1991). Similarly, the Model Business 
Corporation Act empowers courts to order the involuntary dissolution of a corporation if a 
shareholder establishes that (i) the directors are in a deadlock that cannot be broken by the 
shareholders; (ii) the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, 
or will act in a manner that is "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent;" (iii) the shareholders are 
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2. Essential Facilities and Antitrust Damages 
The essential facilities doctrine in antitrust law provides another 
example of a classic pliability rule. Originating in United States v. 
Terminal Railroad Association,118 the doctrine renders it illegal for 
owners of "essential facilities" to deny others access as the result of 
anticompetitive motives or under conditions that reduce competition. 
Essential facilities are facilities that cannot practically be duplicated 
and are necessary for competitors' survival.119 The case of Terminal 
Railroad is illuminating. There, financier Jay Gould established a 
group that acquired control over all the facilities necessary to load or 
unload freight or passengers, or cross the Mississippi River in the area 
of St. Louis. Gould's group used its monopoly power to impose pre­
mium pricing on users of the facilities owned by his group. The 
Terminal Railroad Court found in this arrangement a violation of sec­
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. However, rather than strip Gould of 
his property by ordering divestiture, the Court established that Gould 
could maintain his monopoly over the St. Louis nexus - a facility es­
sential to trans-Mississippi traffic in the .Midwest - so long as pricing 
(and other terms of usage) were regulated.12° 
The essential facilities doctrine has been extended to a wide array 
of assets, including electricity distribution networks,121 telephone 
transmission and switching systems,122 gas pipelines,123 and the New 
deadlocked and have been unable to elect directors for at least two consecutive annual 
meetings; or (iv) the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted. See MODEL Bus. 
CORP. ACT § 14.30(2) (1969) (amended 1984); Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. Goldman, 
Some Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 737, 747 (2001). The "oppression" ground is most often 
cited in petitions for dissolution, and some courts have recognized a cause of action for op­
pression outside of the dissolution context. See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholders 
Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW. 699 (1993). However, dissolution proceedings 
rarely result in the actual dissolution of the corporation but often result in a buyout of the 
petitioner's shares, or, more rarely, the petitioner's buyout of the majority's shares. See, e.g., 
Park McGinty, Replacing Hostile Takeovers, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 983, 999-1002 {1996) (con­
cluding that involuntary dissolution "either levels the terrain on which oppressed minority 
shareholders negotiate or (quite rarely) forces liquidation"). 
118. 224 U.S. 383 {1912). 
119. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
120. See generally Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999). 
121. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); City of Anaheim v. 
S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992); City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 
F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1992). 
122. See MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 
1983); Bell Atl. Corp. v. MFS Communications Co., 901 F. Supp. 835 (D. Del. 1995). 
123. See City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1992); 
Illinois ex rel. Burris v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 935 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1991); Garshman 
v. Universal Res. Holding, Inc., 824 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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York Stock Exchange.124 The aim, in all cases, has been to preserve the 
advantages of unified control of the essential facility, on the one hand, 
and to avoid the inefficiencies of monopoly pricing, on the other.125 
The doctrine requires courts to mandate access to privately owned 
property once it becomes essential for competition. Thus, the essential 
facilities doctrine provides an example of a judicially triggered classic 
pliability rule. Upon a judicial finding of an essential facility, the 
owner's property rule protection over her essential facility changes 
into liability rule protection. She retains ownership of the facility but 
must grant access to competitors at a price determined or reviewed by 
a third party - the court or a regulator. 
The use of a pliability rule in the instance of essential facilities en­
ables courts to preserve the baseline advantages of property rules dis­
cussed earlier - such as encouraging optimal investment and reducing 
transaction costs - while introducing liability rules in those cases 
where circumstances make such rules more advantageous. Specifically, 
the liability rule stage diminishes the social deadweight loss associated 
with monopoly pricing by granting competitors access to necessary fa­
cilities at an approximation of competitive pricing. 
In mandating a liability rule as the second stage of the pliability 
rule, rather than dividing the property among different firms, the es­
sential facilities doctrine produces another benefit. Keeping the prop­
erty together under one roof preserves the economies of scale pro­
duced by natural monopolies, while the liability rule avoids the cost of 
monopolistic pricing. In a natural monopoly, the cost of providing a 
service declines with output, making a single provider the optimum 
from a cost perspective.126 
124. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
125. To effectuate the balance, the essential facilities doctrine imposes liability on a 
Sherman Act section 2 defendant when the plaintiff proves the following elements: (1) con­
trol of an essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability reasonably or practi· 
cally to duplicate the essential facility; (3) denial of the use of the facility to the competitor; 
and (4) providing the competitor access to the facility is feasible. See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132· 
33 {laying out four factors); JULIAN o. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND 
TRADE REGULATION § 25.04[3] n.114 {2d ed. 2001) (listing cases adopting or citing with ap­
proval the MCI formulation of the elements of an essential facilities case). However, the es­
sential facilities doctrine has not met with universal approval. See, e.g. , Philip E. Areeda, Es· 
sential Facilities: An Epithet In Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990) 
(arguing that no Supreme Court case has provided a consistent rationale for the doctrine or 
has explored either the social costs and benefits or the administrative costs of requiring the 
creator of an asset to share it with a rival). 
126. See ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 70 (4th ed. 1994) ("In what is known as a 'natural monopoly,' a 
single firm's average costs decline with output, meaning that it is always less costly for the 
one firm to produce any level of output rather than subdivide production among two or 
more firms."); Christopher Wyeth Kirkham, Busting the Administrative Trust: An Experi· 
mentalist Approach to Universal Service Administration in Telecommunications Policy, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 620, 621 n.4 (1998) (describing natural monopolies as "situations in which 
the marginal cost of production or service provision declines with increasing economies of 
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So far, our discussion has focused on the ex post effect of the es­
sential facility doctrine - i.e., the outcome that results from the appli­
cation of the doctrine. It is also important to note the ex ante effect of 
the doctrine, particularly the incentive it creates for self regulation. 
Because owners of facilities that may eventually be found essential 
know that they enjoy only pliability rule, not property rule protection, 
they will self-regulate in order to remain in the property rule stage of 
the pliability rule. They can do so either by ensuring that they do not 
accumulate assets in a way that stymies competition, or by voluntarily 
granting access to competitors. 
This last point demonstrates a broader implication of pliability 
analysis of antitrust law. The essential facilities doctrine is not the sole 
antitrust remedy to employ pliability rules; indeed, pliability rules may 
be seen as the animating principle behind antitrust law. In a pliability 
scale across the size of the entire market," and noting that "[i]n such a case, optimal social 
utility is arguably gained by concentrating production in a single enterprise"); Joseph 
Montiero & Gerald Robertson, Shipping Conference Legislation in Canada, the European 
Economic Community and the United States: Background, Emerging Developments, Trends 
and a Few Major Issues, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 141, 203 (1999) (explaining that the cost function of 
a natural monopolist is subadditive at output because it is more expensive for two or more 
firms to produce than it is for the natural monopolist to produce alone). 
Natural monopolies may arise in various contexts. For telecommunications, see Daniel 
F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25 (1995) (discussing 
natural monopoly in the context of telecommunications). But see Robert W. Crandall & J. 
Gregory Sidak, Competition and Regulatory Policies for Interactive Broadband Networks, 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1214 (1995) (warning that "[w]hen formulating policies for interactive 
broadband networks . . .  regulators should be cautious about assuming that natural monop­
oly will necessarily characterize such networks" because "[w]hat was once a naturally mo­
nopolistic method for delivering a particular kind of telecommunications service may be 
supplanted over time by a lower-cost method that does not necessarily have large sunk costs 
and low incremental costs"). For public utilities, see Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to 
Serve" and Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restruc­
turing, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (1998) (defining a "public utility" as "a large vertically­
integrated firm that provides service to all customers within its geographically-defined serv­
ice area"), especially the transmission segments of public utilities, see Christopher G. Bond, 
Shedding New Light on the Economics of Electric Restructuring: Are Retail Markets for 
Electricity the Answer to Rising Energy Costs?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1311, 1323 (2001) (noting 
that "[t]he transmission segments of the traditional public utilities (electricity, phone, and 
gas) are often cited as the best examples of natural monopolies"). For water works and cable 
television, see Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 401 n.8 
{9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that "electric utilities, water works, and cable television are gen­
erally highly regulated" because "these industries are paradigmatic examples of natural mo­
nopolies"). For newspaper delivery, see Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht 
Rule after Kahn: Death Becomes Her, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 123, 152 (1998) (noting that 
"newspaper delivery has natural monopoly characteristics in very small areas"). 
On the economics of natural monopoly, see generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., 
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 8 (rev. ed. 1988); 
SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 22 (1988); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, 
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 295-96 (2d ed. 1994); ROGER SHERMAN, THE 
REGULATION OF MONOPOLY 80-81 {1989); DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND 
MARKETS 3 (1989); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 19-20 
(1988); KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
NATURAL MONOPOLY 6-8 (1991). 
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analysis, antitrust law aims at defining the anticompetitive conditions 
that should trigger a change of legal protection from one type of prop­
erty rule protection to a different type of property or liability rule. In 
contrast to the essential facilities doctrine, not all antitrust remedies 
create classic pliability rules. For example, remedies requiring the 
break up of the anticompetitive corporation can be seen as enforcing a 
title shifting pliability rule in which, upon the occurrence of a given 
triggering condition, property rule protection passes from the hands of 
one entitlement holder (the anticompetitive corporation) to one or 
more other entitlement holders. 
3. Post-Boomer Nuisance 
Finally, we turn to the nuisance rule created by Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement Co. 127 as yet another example of a classic pliability rule. In 
Boomer, a group of homeowners brought a lawsuit seeking to enjoin 
the nuisance caused by pollution from the Atlantic Cement plant. De­
viating from the established rule of awarding injunctions in such cases, 
the New York Court of Appeals permitted the plant to continue op­
erations, provided that Atlantic Cement pay permanent damages to 
the homeowners. The court reasoned that the Atlantic Cement plant 
was too valuable relative to the homeowners' pollution losses to fol­
low the traditional rule. For Calabresi and Melamed, the Boomer de­
cision represents an instance of liability rule protection. Effectively, 
the court prevented the homeowners from exercising their property 
rule right to exclude Atlantic Cement's pollution. Instead, the court 
forced them to suffer the pollution in exchange for the liability rule 
compensation decreed by the court. 
While Calabresi and Melamed's static perspective is valid in de­
scribing the immediate effect of the Boomer decision, its impact from 
the dynamic perspective we offer is even more far reaching. In juris­
dictions adopting Boomer's reasoning as a rule of law, Boomer created 
a pliability rule. Under the Boomer pliability rule, homeowners enjoy 
property rule protection against all nuisances in stage one. However, 
once a nuisance-creating activity becomes sufficiently valuable, the 
Boomer rule downgrades the homeowners' entitlement into liability 
rule protection. The Boomer pliability rule thus aims to preserve 
property rules in most cases, while adopting liability rule protection 
where enjoining a nuisance diminishes economic efficiency. Impor­
tantly, the retention of the property rule baseline in this case would 
create a hold-out problem, as it would force Atlantic Cement to buy 
out the injunction from each of plaintiffs-homeowners. Conversely, 
127. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
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eliminating property rule protection altogether would excessively re­
duce incentives for investment in the property. 
C. Zero Order Pliability Rules 
Like classic pliability rules, zero order pliability rules begin with 
property rule protection for the entitlement holder. However, by con­
trast with classic pliability rules, in the second, liability, stage of the 
pliability rule, the expected liability damages for use of the asset are 
zero. Thus, in zero order pliability rules, property rule protection is 
succeeded by a no-liability rule. Upon the triggering event, the initial 
entitlement holder loses the ability to exercise property rule protec­
tion, such as the right to exclude, over her property. Instead, all com­
ers may use the property free of charge - that is, with zero order 
liability. Notwithstanding the zero order liability, no third party may 
gain a superior right to that of the original entitlement holder. The 
zero order pliability rules may therefore be seen as creating anti­
exclusion, open access, or common property regimes. 
As the examples we bring from copyright and patent make clear, 
zero order pliability rule protection is ubiquitous in the context of in­
tellectual property. There, zero order pliability rules serve both eco­
nomic efficiency and the interests of fairness. Zero order pliability 
preserves property rule protection necessary to encourage investment 
in useful inventions, while also using zero order liability to curb the 
deadweight loss created by monopoly power over the creation. Like­
wise, zero order pliability balances the claims of justice by the creator 
who wants exclusive control over her creation, on the one hand, and 
the public that claims a need to use the creation, on the other. 
1. Copyright and Patent Protection 
Nowhere is the role of property protection in inducing investment 
in resources more evident than in the context of copyright and patent 
law. Copyright law creates and protects exclusive rights in expressive 
works of authorship. Patent law provides protection for innovative 
products, processes, and designs. Both bodies of law are rooted in 
utilitarian philosophy, and the principal justification for their existence 
in the United States is widely known as the "incentive theory."128 In-
128. See, e.g. , Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962); Stanley M. 
Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 
5 J. ECON. PERS. 3, 5 (1991); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of 
Copyrights in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 291-93 
(1970); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602-12 
(1982); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 
AM. ECON. REV. 421, 425 (1966) (papers and proceedings); William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) 
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deed, the utilitarian grounding of American copyright and patent law 
is even manifested in the Constitutional intellectual property clause, 
which empowers Congress to create exclusive rights in intellectual 
works in order "to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts."129 
The need for an economic incentive in the field of intellectual 
property stems from the "public good" characteristics of intellectual 
goods.130 Unlike tangible goods, public goods share two distinctive 
characteristics: nonrivalry of consumption and nonexcludability of 
benefits.131 A good is nonrival in consumption when a unit of that good 
can be consumed by one person without diminishing in the slightest 
the consumption opportunities available to others from that same 
unit. 132 A good displays nonexcludable benefits when individuals who 
have not paid for the production of that good cannot be prevented at a 
reasonable cost from availing themselves of its benefits.133 The non­
excludability property of public goods gives rise to two related prob­
lems. First, public goods are likely to be under-produced if left to the 
private market. Second, markets for public goods will not form. 
Since inventions and expressive works are essentially information 
goods, they too are susceptible to the twin problems of under­
production and lack of market exchange.134 In the absence of legal pro-
[hereinafter Landes & Posner, Copyright Law]; Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in 
Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (1996); Barry W. Tyerrnan, The Economic Ra­
tionale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA 
L. REV. 1100, 1100-01 (1971). 
129. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. Edward Walterscheid points out that the intellectual prop­
erty clause "is unique in being the only instance wherein the delegates prescribed a specific 
mode of accomplishing the particular authority granted." See Edward C. Walterscheid, To 
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intel­
lectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 33 (1994). 
130. See, e.g. , Gordon, supra note 128, at 1610; Landes & Posner, Copyright Law, supra 
note 128, at 326; see also Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Perez, The Competition of Tech­
nologies in M!lrkets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L 
REV. L. & ECON. 209, 218 (1985). For a view that intellectual works do not share the distin­
guishing attributes of public goods, see Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non­
Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 273-87 (1989). 
131. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 46-48 (1st 
ed. 1988); RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, 
PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6-7 (1986); EDWIN MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF 
MARCROECONOMICS 400-04 (6th ed. 1989). 
132. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 131, at 160. 
133. See id. It should be noted that the impossibility of exclusion is hardly ever absolute. 
As a matter of fact, when exclusion by contract is considered, very few goods, if any, display 
nonexcludable benefits in the strict sense of the term. Thus, it is more accurate to describe 
goods as displaying nonexcludable benefits when it is prohibitively costly to bar nonpayers 
from enjoying the good. See Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual 
Property, 68 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 631, 632 (1993). 
134. See, e.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, 
Study No. 15, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings 
of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247 (1994); John S. McGee, Patent Exploitation: Some 
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tection, competitors of the original inventors and authors would be 
able to copy their inventions or expressive works without incurring the 
initial costs of authorship and research and development. The unau­
thorized reproduction of successful expressive works and inventions 
would drive the market price down to the point where original authors 
and inventors would not be able to recover their initial expenditures. 
Thus, without intellectual property protection, the private returns to 
authors and inventors would fall short of the social value of their 
works and inventions, and too few inventions and expressive works 
would be created. 
Worse yet, many of the inventions that would not materialize 
absent intellectual property protection are likely to be of great social 
value. Socially important inventions are often dependent not only 
upon large expenditures but also upon a high level of risk. Inventors 
often do not know, ex ante, whether their research and development 
will yield the anticipated result. They do not know how the invention 
will fare commercially. Subsequent copiers, however, face no such un­
certainty. Copiers may reproduce - risk-free - only inventions with 
proven commercial success.135 The same holds true of expressive 
works. For expressive works to make it to market, authors must gen­
erally find a publisher who believes the work is commercially viable. 
But publishing is a risky enterprise. Publishing involves a hit-and-miss 
process in which a small number of successful works subsidize the cost 
of publishing all other works. For publishers, commercially successful 
works are used as a risk spreading mechanism, enabling the publisher 
to bring to market various works that may not cover the publication 
and distribution costs. However, copiers may zero in on the successful 
works. By reproducing only successful works, and selling them at a 
lower price, copiers would deprive publishers of the ability to spread 
risk, and thereby force them out of business. 
Patent and copyright protection solve these problems. By creating 
and enforcing exclusive rights in expressive works and inventions, 
copyright and patent law prevent unauthorized copying and thereby 
guarantee adequate rewards to authors and inventors. The right to ex­
clude permits authors and inventors to engage in voluntary transac­
tions with users and set the price of these transactions. Yet, copyright 
and patent are unique property regimes since they restrict the dura­
tion of the property rights they confer. Copyright protection endures 
for the life of the author plus seventy years;136 patent protection lasts 
Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J. L. & ECON. 135 (1966); Richard R. Nelson, The Eco­
nomics of Invention: A Survey of the Literature, 32 J. Bus. 101 (1959); Dan Usher, The Wel­
fare Economics of Invention, 31 ECONOMICA 279 (1964). 
135. See Arrow, supra note 128, at 609, 614-15 (suggesting that the uncertainty as to the 
outcome of the inventive enterprise and the lack of market mechanism for risk shifting, will 
result in underinvestment in inventive activity). 
136. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998). In the case of an anonymous work, a pseudonymous 
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twenty years from the date of filing an application.137 Once the protec­
tion lapses, the formerly protected expressive works and inventions 
fall into the public domain, and anyone can use, reproduce, and mar­
ket them freely. Both patent and copyright are, therefore, examples of 
mandatory zero order pliability rules. In both cases, the initial prop­
erty rule protection changes into a zero order liability rule protection 
at the end of the statutorily prescribed term. 
The use of zero order pliability rules in this context serves several 
important purposes. Patent and copyright law embody a fundamental 
tradeoff between ex ante and ex post efficiency, or, put differently, a 
tradeoff between production and access. Ex ante, patent and copyright 
law seek to spur adequate production of information goods; ex post, 
after the information goods have been produced, they seek to ensure 
the widest possible access to these goods. As the intellectual property 
clause clearly indicates, the purpose of establishing exclusive rights in 
intellectual goods is not to reward authors and inventors per se, but 
rather, to promote the production and dissemination of new informa­
tion to the public.138 The exclusivity conferred upon authors and inven­
tors promotes the creation of new works and innovation, but it does so 
at the cost of curtailing the dissemination of the new information 
products to the public. Copyright and patent protection essentially 
grant monopoly power to authors and inventors, and thus, like all mo­
nopolies, generates a social "dead-weight" loss. The same exclusivity 
that induces creativity and investment also brings about supra­
competitive prices, and leads to the exclusion of certain consumers 
who would have been willing to pay the competitive price.139 Robert 
Cooter and Thomas Ulen have stated the basic dilemma presented by 
intellectual property is that "without a legal monopoly not enough in­
formation will be produced, but with legal monopoly too little of the 
information will be used."140 
The zero order pliability rule mitigates the tension between the 
two social goals that intellectual property law seeks to promote. The 
initial property rule protection - represented by the limited monop­
oly - underwrites the production of information goods. The subse­
quent zero order pliability rule - represented by the eventual fall of 
expressive works and inventions into the public domain - guarantees 
work, or a work made for hire, the copyright endures for the shorter of 95 years from the 
year of its first publication, or 120 years from the year of its creation. Id. § 302( c). 
137. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1999). 
138. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 1-70 (5th ed. 2000). 
139. See, e.g. , Christian Koboldt, Intellectual Property and Optimal Copyright Protection, 
19 J. CULT. ECON. 131 (1995) (arguing that even optimal copyright protection cannot lead to 
a first-best allocative efficiency solution). 
140. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 131, at 135 (in latest edition, 3d ed. 2000, similar 
proposition, but not same sentence, appears on page 128). 
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the public unrestricted access to information goods once the limited 
monopoly expires. The limited duration is supposed to guarantee that 
the goal of copyright and patent protection is positive because in the 
final analysis the goal of copyright and patent is to make more and 
better intellectual products available to every one.141 
The employment of a zero order pliability rule serves another pol­
icy goal: it reduces the cost of subsequent authorship and innovation. 
It is important to realize that the public domain is not merely the 
sphere of works whose protection has expired; it is also a source of the 
raw materials for future authorship and invention.142 Works whose 
protection has expired ensure the continuity of authorship and innova­
tion as they perpetually replenish the supply of expression and 
knowledge for future authors and inventors to draw on. Furthermore, 
public domain works reduce the cost of creation and research for fu­
ture authors and inventors, and consequently, the total cost of pro­
ducing intellectual works. 
The zero order pliability rule protection is also attractive on dis­
tributional grounds. Those most likely to be harmed by the monopo­
lies wrought by copyright and especially patent protection are the least 
well-off. Low-income consumers can ill-afford to pay the supra­
competitive prices charged for patented products and copyrighted 
works during the property rule protection period. The shift to a zero 
order liability rule opens up the market to competition and enables 
low-income consumers to enjoy previously over-priced goods. Con­
sider, for example, pharmaceutical drugs. The need to recoup their ini­
tial investment in R&D prompts brand name pharmaceutical compa­
nies to charge supra-competitive prices for patented drugs. The 
principal victims of the monopoly pricing are the indigent 143 and the 
141. It bears emphasis that we do not suggest that the current protection term is opti­
mal. Nor do we endorse it. Our analysis has nothing to say about the issue. We merely seek 
to explain the use of zero order pliability rules in intellectual property law. 
142. See, e.g. , Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. %5, 968 (1990). 
143. For analysis of the effect of monopoly pricing on poor countries see, for example, 
Bernard Pecoul, Fighting for Survival, HARV. INT'L REV., Fall 2001, at 60 (noting that inter­
national trade agreements and patenting of medicines in other parts of the world influence 
the global marketing and pricing policies of research-based pharmaceutical companies, 
which in tum impacts the availability and affordability of medicines, including AIDS medi­
cines, in the least-developed countries); Jonathan Mann et al., South Africa's AIDS Agree­
ment, CNN INT'L: INSIGHT (Apr. 19, 2001), available at 2001 WL 14386528 (reporting that 
" [t]he commercial price of the triple therapy treatment to control HIV costs up to $10,000 
[per] year per patient. That dwarfs the per capita income of every African country"; also re­
porting that in response to a "well-organized, high-profile campaign by pressure groups, the 
major drug companies have slashed their prices to the poorest countries. In Zambia, about 
20 percent of the population is infected with HIV. [Recently], Glaxo Smith, Bristol Myers 
Squibb and Merck offered the Zambian government a deal so that anti-retroviral treatment 
would cost two dollars a day"); Anthony Birritteri, Intellectual Property Protection a Must 
for Drug Firm Success, N.J. Bus., June 2001, at 56 (reporting the April 2001 settlement be­
tween South Africa and thirty-nine drug manufacturers, allowing the country to broaden 
access to medicines for the estimated 4.7 million South Africans with AIDS in exchange for 
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elderly,144 who most critically need the new drugs, but lack sufficient 
funds to afford them. Furthermore, even those who can purchase the 
drugs overpay for them since the drug companies, owing to their mo­
nopoly power appropriate most, if not all, of the consumer surplus. 
The price of new drugs falls dramatically, however, once the patent 
protection expires and generic drugs enter the market. Indeed, ac­
cording to some reports, two years after their introduction to the mar­
ket, the price of generic substitutes is on average 35-38% of the price 
of the relevant brand name drug, and the market share of the generics 
averages 45-59%.145 It bears emphasis, though, that without the initial 
inducement provided by the patent protection, neither the original 
drugs nor the generic substitutes would be produced. Thus, the use of 
pliability rule protection in this context induces scientific progress, en­
courages competition among various drug manufacturers in the long 
term, and offers significant distributive advantages relative to standard 
property rule protection. 
2. Genericism in Trademark Law 
The genericism doctrine in trademark law is yet another example 
of a zero order pliability rule. Trademark law protects symbolic infor­
mation signifying the source of goods and services.146 Unlike patent 
and copyright protection that seek to spur creation of inventions and 
adherence to wro patent laws). 
144. John M.R. Bull, Subsidized Drugs for Seniors Facing Deficit, P11TSBURGH POST­
GAZETTE, Nov. 28, 2001, at B8 (discussing the financial difficulties of Pennsylvania's pro­
gram to subsidize prescription drugs for senior citizens, called Pharmaceutical Assistance 
Contract for the Elderly, or "PACE"); Howard Dean, Deft Scalpel, NAT'L J., Nov. 17, 2001, 
at 3617 (reviewing GEORGE D. LUNDBERG, SEVERED TRUST: WHY AMERICAN MEDICINE 
HASN'T BEEN FIXED (2000)) (describing the Congressional debate over prescription drug 
benefits for the elderly, and noting that "Democrats argue for a straight government­
financed Medicare prescription drug benefit carrying a price tag of about $300 billion," while 
"Republicans press for a program in which the government provides vouchers so that pa­
tients can buy private insurance."); Inside the Industry: Pfizer Announces New Pharmacy 
Discount Card for Seniors, AM. HEALTH LINE, Jan. 16, 2002, available at Westlaw, 1/1612002 
APN-HE6 (noting the strength of "political pressure on the affordability of medicine for the 
elderly"); Morton Mintz, Still Hard to Swallow, WASH. POST, Feb. 11 ,  2001, at Bl (reporting 
that "[w)hat's new about prescription drug pricing is the attention that it's been getting in 
Congress, thanks partly to bus loads of elderly Americans going to Canada and Mexico to 
buy their medicines at sharply lower costs"). 
145. See Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents for Increased Generic Com­
petition in the U.S.: The Waxman-Hatch Act After One Decade, 10 PHARMACOECONOMICS 
110 (Supp. 2, 1996); William Haddad, Testing Times for the U.S. Generic Industry, SCRIP 
MAG., May 1992, at 26, 27; U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N No. 332-302, GLOBAL 
COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY MFG. INDUS.: PHARMACEUTICALS 
13-16 (Sept. 1991). 
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also Ralph S. Brown Jr., Advertising 
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1185 (1948) 
("The informative job of trade symbols is conventionally considered to be identification of 
source; and it is this capacity which courts traditionally have protected."). 
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expressive works, trademark protection purports to enhance competi­
tion among providers of goods and services.147 Trademarks promote 
competition in two related ways. Trademarks - by themselves and in 
combination with other forms of advertising - convey information 
about the quality of products and services, reducing consumers' search 
costs.148 This informational function of trademarks is especially valu­
able in the context of experience goods, where consumers cannot dis­
cern the attributes of products before purchasing them,149 and must 
rely on prior experience in deciding among competing brands. Trade­
marks allow consumers to associate product and service attributes 
with certain firms and base their consumption decisions on this asso­
ciation.150 For this reason, on the supply side, trademark protection 
spurs firms to maintain and improve the quality of their products and 
services.151 The availability of trademark protection protects firms 
from free-riding by competitors, enabling them to reap the fruits of 
their investment in superior products and services. Furthermore, 
trademark protection provides firms with an incentive to establish 
brand recognition and loyalty, by "educating" consumers about the 
virtues of their products. Thus, trademarks constitute an important 
channel of communication between firms and consumers, with the at­
tendant twin effects of motivating the former to improve the quality of 
their products and enabling the latter to differentiate among various 
products on the market. 
147. See s. REP. No. 79-1331, at 3 (1946); H.R. REP. No. 79-219, at 2 (1945) ("Trade­
marks defeat monopoly by stimulating competition."). 
148. See, e.g. , Nicholas Economides, Trademarks, in THE NEW P (\LG RAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LA w 601, 602-03 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (noting that trade­
marks "facilitate and enhance consumer decisions"); William P. Kratzke, Normative Eco­
nomic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 199, 214-17 (1991). 
149. The term "experience goods" was coined by Philip Nelson, Information and Con­
sumer Behavior, 78 J. POLmCAL ECON. 311 (1970); Philip Nelson, Advertising as Informa­
tion, 82 J. POLITICAL ECON. 729 (1974). A search good is one whose important attributes 
may be ascertained before purchase or use. Besides search and experience goods, a third 
category, usually applied to services, is "credence." A credence quality cannot be evaluated 
by direct observation or use. For example, a consumer may purchase automobile repair 
services and never discover, before or after the purchase, whether the repair was necessary. 
See Michael Darby & Edi Kami, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. 
& ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973). 
. 
150. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1690 (1999) (noting that advertising communicates the "experience" 
characteristics of goods directly to consumers, while "trademarks ensure that consumers as­
sociate the characteristics with the right product" when making purchasing decisions). 
151. William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 
30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) (hereinafter Landes & Posner, Trademark Law]. Landes 
and Posner note that trademarks have a self-enforcing quality since they denote "consistent 
quality, and a firm has an incentive to develop a trademark only if it is able to maintain con­
sistent quality." Id. at 270. 
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As a general rule, any expressive term or symbol may be used as a 
trademark as long as it is distinctive and nondeceptive.152 However, 
generic terms may not be used as trademarks.153 The doctrine of gen­
ericism has two temporal dimensions: a prospective dimension and a 
retrospective dimension. Prospectively, the genericism doctrine bars 
the appropriation of generic terms such as "WINE" or 
"COMPUTER" as trademarks. Courts have applied the doctrine pro­
spectively to deny trademark protection to terms such as, 
"INJURY,"154 "386,"155 "HONEY BROWN,"156 "YOU HA VE 
MAIL," and "BUDDY LIST."157 The genericism doctrine may also be 
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(l) (1988); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763, 769 (1992) ("The general rule regarding distinctiveness is clear: an identifying mark 
is distinctive and capable of being protected if it either (l) is inherently distinctive or (2) has 
acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning."); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to 
Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1673 (1999) ("For word marks, the use of broad categories de­
terminative of inherent distinctiveness avoids the administrative costs of a case-by-case bal­
ancing of the informational advantages and competitive disadvantages of protection. It also 
affords a degree of predictability, valued both in decisions to adopt and decisions to imitate a 
putative trademark."). 
Traditionally, trademark protection sprang into existence upon the use of a mark in 
trade. In 1988, the Lanham Act was amended to create a federal registry of trademarks, see 
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, and now busi­
nesses can register marks even before using them in trade upon a showing of a bona fide in­
tent to use them in the future. See Lanham Act § l(b), (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) 
(1994)); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 5 (4th ed. 2001) (noting that "[b]y far the most sweeping change [effected by the 1988 
amendments) was the inclusion of an 'intent-to-use' basis for applications," which granted 
"United States firm[s] . . .  the option to apply for federal registration of a mark based on a 
bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce"). Descriptive marks, such as "Burger," see In 
re Nat'! Presto Indus., Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 188 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (holding "Burger" for cooking 
utensils descriptive of purpose of goods), "PM," see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033 (2d. Cir. 1992) (holding term "PM" descriptive of an an­
algesic/sleep aid designed for night-time use), and "KING SIZE," see King-Size, Inc. v. 
Frank's King Size Clothes, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1 138 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding the term "KING 
SIZE" descriptive of men's clothes), may only be registered if they have acquired a secon­
dary meaning. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (explaining that "descriptive marks may ac­
quire the distinctiveness which will allow them to be protected under the [Lanham] Act . . . .  
This acquired distinctiveness is generally called 'secondary meaning' "). 
153. Originally, genericism was a court-made doctrine. See, e.g., Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1871); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 735 (1938). Today, the doctrine 
is codified in the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994). A generic term is one that 
denotes "the name of a kind of goods . . .  [u]nlike a trademark, which identifies the source of 
a product, a generic term merely identifies the genus of which the particular product is a 
species." Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 1986). 
154. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that the 
"injury" portion of the mark "INJURY-I," a telephone number mnemonic, is generic and 
therefore unprotected as a trademark). 
155. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 
(ruling that Intel's mark "386" is generic and thus not protected). 
156. Genesee Brewing Co. Inc. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F. 3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997) (con­
cluding that the term "HONEY BROWN" is generic when applied to ale beer). 
157. America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 64 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding 
that service marks "YOU HAVE MAIL" and "BUDDY LIST" are generic rather than sug­
gestive). 
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applied retrospectively to invalidate trademarks that were initially dis­
tinctive, but through overuse became generic. Examples of marks that 
initially received protection but were later nullified on genericism 
grounds include, among others, "aspirin,"158 "cola,"159 "thermos,"160 
"corn-flakes,"161 yo-yo,"162 "trampoline,"163 "escalator,"164 and "lino­
leum."165 The retrospective application of the genericism doctrine ef­
fectively transforms the initial property rule protection accorded to 
the trademark owner into a zero order liability rule protection. Yet, 
the lapse of property rule protection is not automatic after the passage 
of time, as in the case of property and patent. Rather, the property 
rule stage of the zero order pliability rule is brought to a close by an 
event whose timing - and even existence - is uncertain: the trans­
formation of the meaning of a term to a generic one. 
The application of a zero order pliability rule in this context has 
several desirable efficiency effects. Although trademark protection 
generally promotes efficiency by fostering competition, trademarks 
also have a potential dark side. Excessively strong trademarks may 
harm competition since they constitute barriers to entry.166 In such 
cases, the social cost of protecting trademarks may outweigh the social 
benefit. Consider, for instance, the term "cola." If the term were a 
protected trademark of the Coca-Cola company, competitors who 
produced similarly tasting beverages could not use the term "cola" to 
describe their products. Under this regime, competitors' marketing ef­
forts would be stifled, and consumers would have to pay supra­
competitive prices for the trademarked product.167 The genericism 
158. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
159. Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1943); Dixi-Cola 
Labs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941). 
160. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963). 
161. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE 
DOCTRINES 243 (4th ed. 1997) (reproducing an ad by Xerox entitled, "Once a Trademark 
not always a trademark," that lists examples of trademarks that have become generic.). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. In the 1930s economists believed that all forms of trademark protection were 
anticompetitive. The most notable champion of this view was Edward Chamberlin, who ar­
gued that the combination of trademark protection and persuasive advertising form barriers 
to entry. See EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
(1st ed. 1933). For an excellent review of the debate as to the effect of trademark protection 
on competition, see Daniel M. McClure, The Lanham Act After Fifty Years: Trademarks and 
Competition: The Recent History, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 13. 
167. See John F. Coverdale, Comment, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect on 
Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868, 870-71 (1984) (noting that when there is only one 
word to describe a product, trademark protection would equate to monopoly power). 
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doctrine avoids this undesirable result. It empowers courts to termi­
nate, in extreme cases, the property rule protection of marks whose 
value to third parties - i.e., competitors and consumers - exceeds 
their value to their original appropriators. Essentially, the genericism 
doctrine is an ex post mechanism for reallocating generic terms to a 
higher value user: the public, consumers, and competitors alike.168 
Hence, the genericism doctrine provides a nonmarket mechanism for 
improving allocative efficiency. 
The ex ante effects of the genericism doctrine are even more inter­
esting. Ex ante, the genericism doctrine gives rise to two pro­
competitive effects: self-regulation and informative advertising. The 
key to both effects lies in the use of a conditional zero order pliability 
rule to protect trademarks. Trademarks do not become generic by 
mishap; the decisions of trademark owners determine the marks' fates. 
Trademark owners determine the exposure of their marks as well as 
which information and image to convey to consumers. Marks become 
generic either because there is insufficient competition in the relevant 
product or service market, or because trademark owners promote 
their brand names too aggressively. The genericism doctrine curbs the 
incentive of firms to engage in these types of anticompetitive behavior. 
To avoid the risk of losing protection, firms must ensure that the pub­
lic does not associate the mark with a particular product, rather than a 
particular producer. The safest way to accomplish this is to ensure 
some degree of competition in the product, or service markets, in 
which dominant mark owners operate. The risk of genericism causes 
firms to self-regulate by introducing a winner's curse to trademarked 
markets. Over-aggressiveness toward existing competitors may result 
in the firm's mark - an asset it has labored hard to promote -
becoming available to all competitors, both existing and future. Exer­
cising restraint toward smaller competitors, on the other hand, goes a 
long way towards securing the longevity of the mark. Thus, the use of 
conditional pliability rule protection in this context encourages com­
petition in product and service markets. 
The doctrine of genericism also produces desirable information ef­
fects. In a classic article, Ralph Brown noted the symbiotic relation­
ship between trademarks and advertising.169 Brown argued that the 
scope of protection afforded to trademarks must be calibrated to the 
degree to which advertising promotes the public interest. Brown main-
168. As for the prospective dimension of genericism, Landes and Posner have suggested 
that by barring existing generic terms from becoming trademarks, trademark law provides 
an incentive to "enrich the language, by creating words or phrases that people value for their 
intrinsic pleasingness as well as their information value." They explicitly recognize, however, 
that this benefit is very "small." See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 151, at 
271. 
169. See Brown, supra note 146; see also Symposium, Ralph Sharp Brown, Intellectual 
Property and the Public Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 1611 {1999). 
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tained that trademarks' chief virtue lies in their ability to promote 
competition through advertising. By prompting merchants to adver­
tise, trademark protection enhances the information available to po­
tential consumers, thus improving consumption decisions.170 Influ­
enced by the economists of his time, Brown distinguished between 
"informative advertising" and "persuasive advertising," postulating 
that the former was beneficial and the latter harmful.171 Subsequent 
economic work called into question Brown's characterization of per­
suasive advertising, noting that even "persuasive" advertising may also 
produce various efficiency enhancing effects. Philip Nelson, for in­
stance, pointed out that much of what Brown considered persuasive 
advertising serves an important signaling function, which improves the 
information available to consumers. Since businesses receive greater 
returns on advertising that produces repeat sales, the level of adver­
tising for a product provides a useful indication of consumer satisfac­
tion.172 Irrespective of the ultimate desirability of persuasive advertis­
ing, Brown's basic insight about the direct effect of trademark 
protection on the market for commercial information remains valid. 
D. Simultaneous Pliability Rules 
Intellectual property also provides an example of a different kind 
of pliability rule: the simultaneous pliability rule. As usual, simultane­
ous pliability rules involve at least two different stages of property or 
liability rule protection, and the fulfillment of a predetermined condi­
tion triggers a shift from one type of protection to the other. However, 
unlike the other pliability rules we have discussed so far, the triggering 
condition does not take place at a discrete moment in time and the 
types of protection are not sequential chronologically. Rather, a single 
asset is simultaneously protected by different kinds of rules, depend­
ing on the kind of use. Vis-a-vis some uses, the entitlement holder en­
joys the baseline property rule protection. However, certain kinds of 
uses trigger another kind of protection, such as liability rule protec­
tion. 
Simultaneous pliability rules were clearly recognized by Calabresi 
and Melamed, albeit without being labeled as such. In fact, Calabresi 
170. Brown, supra note 146, at 1186. 
171. Id. at 1183 ("With qualifications that need not be repeated, persuasive advertising 
is, for the community as a whole, just a luxurious exercise in talking ourselves into spending 
our incomes."). Brown's view of persuasive advertising was heavily influenced by the work 
of the economist Edward Chamberlin, who argued that the combination of trademark pro­
tection and persuasive advertising form barriers to entry. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 166. 
172. See Philip J. Nelson, The Economic Value of Advertising, in ADVERTISING AND 
SOCIETY 43 (Yale Brozen ed., 1974). Other economists went even further doubting the abil­
ity of advertising to generate demand. See, e.g., JULIAN L. SIMON, ISSUES IN THE 
ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING 205-06 (1970). 
50 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1 
and Melamed noted that "most entitlements to most goods are 
mixed," thereby admitting that protection of entitlements can hardly 
ever be described as falling under one of the pure rule types.173 Our 
modest contribution here is to integrate Calabresi and Melamed's in­
sight into our broader framework of pliability rules. For this reason, 
we limit our discussion of simultaneous pliability rules to two exam­
ples. 
We emphasize that simultaneous pliability rules differ from other 
pliability rules we discuss in that they lack a dynamic element over 
time. As our examples illustrate, in simultaneous pliability rules, the 
type of protection depends on the type of use or the type of user, and 
does not change over time. 
1. Fair Use 
We illustrate simultaneous pliability rules with the example of the 
fair use doctrine. Ordinarily, as we noted previously, copyrighted 
works enjoy property rule protection for the life of the author plus 
seventy years, followed by a zero order liability regime.174 However, 
even during the period of property rule protection, copyright law rec­
ognizes a fair use privilege.175 An affirmative defense against copyright 
liability, the fair use privilege empowers courts to excuse unauthorized 
appropriation of a copyrighted work when doing so advances the pub-
173. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1093. 
174. See supra Section 11.C.l. The doctrine of experimental use is yet another example 
of a simultaneous pliability rule. Courts have long exempted, in principle, purely 
" 'experimental use[s]' of a patented invention, with no commercial purpose," from in­
fringement liability. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive 
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1989). This implies that patent 
holders do not always operate under property rule protection; as against experimental users, 
patent owners entitlement is protected by a zero order pliability rule. Based on the experi­
mental use doctrine, § 271(e) of the Patent Act, which was added in 1984 as part of the 
Waxman-Hatch Act, now permits generic drug manufacturers to make, use, or sell "a pat­
ented invention . . .  solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs." 35 
U.S.C. § 271(3) (2001). The impact of the section was to dramatically expedite the introduc­
tion of generic drugs to the market upon the expiration of the patent, and thereby cabin the 
discretionary effects of patent grants. Cf Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, To­
wards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. {forthcoming 2002) (dis­
cussing alternative measures for reducing the distortionary effects of patents). 
175. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Section 107 begins with a nonexhaustive list of illustrative 
uses - such as comment, criticism, scholarship, research, news reporting, and teaching -
that may qualify as fair, and then enumerates four factors a court should weigh in deciding 
whether a particular use is fair. The factors listed are: (1) the purpose of the use, including its 
commercial or noncommercial nature; (2) the nature of the protected work of the plaintiff; 
(3) the amount and importance of the parts that were reproduced; (4) the impact of the use 
on the potential market for the copyrighted work. Id. 
Currently, patent law does not recognize a fair use defense. For a proposal to change this 
existing state of affairs by introducing a fair use defense into patent law, see Maureen A. 
O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000). 
October 2002) Pliability Rules 51  
lie benefit without substantially impairing the economic value of  the 
original work.176 Thus, with respect to certain uses, the copyrighted 
work is placed under a zero order liability regime, rather than the or­
dinary property rule regime. 
The "fair use" privilege serves several goals. First, it provides a 
safety valve that may be used to deny copyright protection when the 
perils of monopoly power loom large and the need for additional in­
centive to create is slight.177 In this capacity, the "fair use" doctrine 
constitutes an effective vehicle for mitigating any anticompetitive ef­
fects copyright protection may cause. Second, the doctrine furnishes 
an effective means for overcoming market failures associated with 
high transaction costs or strategic behavior of creators.178 In many 
transactional settings that involve intellectual goods, the cost of volun­
tary exchange is high and the benefits to both parties inconsequential. 
In these situations, a finding of fair use is likely to generate a net bene­
fit to one of the parties without significantly harming the other.179 Fur­
thermore, the fair use privilege reduces the cost of creating subsequent 
works. In many cases, the party standing to benefit from a fair use 
finding is herself an author who borrows preexisting material to create 
her own work. 
The incorporation of a fair use defense turns copyright law into a 
unique example of pliability rule protection. Essentially, the fair use 
privilege entitles third parties to take the intellectual property of oth­
ers without paying any compensation to the property owners.180 Due 
176. See Gordon, supra note 128, at 1601. 
177. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 128, at 1211. The so-called "Zapruder Film" of the assas­
sination of John F. Kennedy is a case in point. 
178. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 128, at 1613; Landes & Posner, Copyright Law, supra 
note 128, at 357-58; Sterk, supra note 128, at 1211.  
179. For instance, a student who wishes to quote a phrase from a copyrighted book is 
likely to incur a significant cost should she choose to secure permission from the copyright 
owner. At the same time, quoting without permission would inflict a negligible harm on the 
copyright owner. 
180. The incomplete privilege of private necessity available in cases of intentional tort 
offers an analogy to fair use. Private necessity permits a defendant to commit an intentional 
tort to another's rights in property to protect a higher-value interest, either in property, bod­
ily security, or life. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 262, 263 & cmt. d (1965). 
Where the higher-value interest belongs to a large class - for example, where the city must 
be saved from a fire - the privilege is one of public necessity and the defendant is relieved 
of any duty to compensate the plaintiff. See id. at § 262 & cmt. d. Where the higher value 
interest belongs to a small group or an individual, however, the privilege is one of private 
necessity and the defendant must compensate the plaintiff. See id. at § 263(2) & cmt. e. 
Because compensation is owing in the latter case, the privilege is said to be "incomplete." 
In the well-known case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 
1910), a shipowner's ship damaged a dock when the owner attempted to moor the ship dur­
ing a storm. The court invoked the incomplete privilege of private necessity to hold the 
shipowner liable. In pliability terms, the doctrine of private necessity transformed the dock­
owner's traditional property rule protection into a simultaneous pliability rule. For most 
uses, the dockowner retained property rule protection; but under extraordinary circum­
stances, the shipowner was permitted to take the dockowner's property for a sum equal to 
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to this unique doctrine, copyright protection is at once a zero order 
pliability rule - since the property right it bestows is limited in time 
- and a simultaneous pliability rule - since the protection copyright 
accords admits of nonconsensual takings. 
2. Privileged Takers 
Another instance of simultaneous pliability protection can be 
found in the case of privileged takers, in which property rule protec­
tion is suspended with respect to some nonconsensual users. These 
privileged users need only pay for their use under liability rules while 
property rule protection remains in force against the rest of the world. 
Such a regime is illustrated by the case of Head v. Amoskeag 
Manufacturing Co. 181 There, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that 
permitted mill owners to dam waters, depriving riparian owners of 
their property, if two conditions were satisfied: first, the taking must 
be for a public benefit; and, second, the mill owners had to pay com­
pensation at 150% of market value. 
In pliability terms, the Supreme Court ruling established a simul­
taneous pliability rule regime. While the riparian owners enjoyed full 
property rule protection vis-a-vis all other trespassers, their right to 
exclude mill operators was protected by a liability rule. It is 
noteworthy, though, that mill owners had to show that the use effect­
ing the taking benefited the public. The employment of a simultaneous 
pliability rule enabled the court to balance the right to private prop­
erty against the interest of the mill owners, and the broader public in 
putting the land to its highest value use. 
The simultaneous pliability rule described in Head differs from 
that seen in fair use in an important respect. Whereas fair use employs 
a zero order liability rule, the simultaneous pliability rule described in 
Head required 150% compensation for riparian owners not covered by 
property rule protection. The reason for this gap in compensation 
schemes can be discerned in the difference between the two types of 
uses permitted by the pliability rules. Users of copyrighted materials 
under the fair use provisions do not take exclusive possession of the 
entitlement. Although fair users utilize the copyrighted materials, the 
entitlement holder may continue to engage in commercial transactions 
regarding the copyrighted materials with other users. Fair use is not 
exclusive of the entitlement holder. Furthermore, fair users are only 
the judicially-determined damages. Importantly, private necessity is distinguishable from fair 
use in that necessity requires compensation while a fair user need not compensate the copy­
right holder. Therefore, building on the typology we have developed, fair use may be termed 
a "zero simultaneous pliability rule" while private necessity may be called a "positive simul­
taneous pliability rule." 
181. 113 U.S. 9 (1885). 
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allowed to take a small part of the entitlement. On the other hand, in 
the Head case, the use permitted by the pliability rule is exclusive. 
Once a mill owner dams water, the flooded or water-deprived riparian 
land is altered indefinitely - for as long as the dam is in operation. 
The riparian owner cannot continue to transact with other potential 
users of the land as she did prior to the damming. The condition of the 
land has been altered, and the pliability rule takes this into account in 
its compensation scheme. 
E. Loperty Rules 
Another type of pliability rule is the loperty rule. By contrast with 
the pliability rules we have discussed so far, loperty rules begin with 
liability rule protection, which, upon the occurrence of a triggering 
event, is transformed into property rule protection. The goal of lop­
erty protection is generally to incentivize the entitlement holder to 
take some action in order to earn property rule protection. Consider 
the famous "fencing out" rule that governed ranging property in the 
American West in the nineteenth century. The fencing out regime re­
versed the common law rule that prevented cattle from grazing on a 
neighbor's land. Instead, the fencing out rule allowed cattle to roam 
freely on others' property until the property was fenced. Thus, land­
owners who wished to enjoy traditional property rule protection over 
their ranches bore the burden of fencing out neighbors' cattle.182 
Analyzed in pliability terms, the fencing out regime sets a zero or­
der liability rule as the baseline for using the land of others. Absent a 
fence, land was presumably part of an open access regime, and cattle 
grazers could use the land without paying compensation. However, 
any landholder could alter the baseline protection by erecting a fence. 
By erecting the fence, the landholder would trigger a change in protec­
tion from zero order liability to property. Under the new property re­
gime, the landowner could exclude cattle grazers by means of injunc­
tion, and could collect damages in the event of a trespass. 
By imposing the burden of exclusion on the landholder, the fenc­
ing out rule achieved two important goals. First, given the presumed 
mutual interest of all cattle ranchers in allowing cattle to roam freely, 
the fencing out rule eliminated the burden of costly negotiati9ns 
among ranchers. Second, the rule created a mechanism for separating 
those owners for whom property rule protection was efficient from 
those whose land was better served by an open access regime. Specifi-
182. ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 76 (1991). Fencing out is still the law in Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-
46-102(1) (Bradford 2001). See generally Terence J. Centner, Reforming Outdated Fence 
Law Provisions: Good Fences Make Good Neighbors Only if They are Fair, 12 J. ENVTL. L. 
& LITIG. 267 (1997). 
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cally, it induced cattle ranchers to assess and communicate to others 
the value of exclusive use of their land. 
Additionally, a loperty rule may also be used to incentivize poten­
tial takers of the entitlement. Consider again the case of Boomer.183 
The Court of Appeals of New York decided to protect homeowners 
affected by a nuisance by means of a liability rule. Atlantic Cement 
was permitted to continue infringing upon homeowners' enjoyment of 
their property and, in exchange, pay the damage amount assessed by 
the court. The court was motivated in part by the concern that requir­
ing Atlantic Cement to develop superior abatement technologies on 
such short notice would be inequitable. Thus, the court determined 
that the homeowners should permanently lose their full property rule 
protection. A judicially crafted loperty rule could have better balanced 
the equities. Under such a loperty rule, Atlantic Cement would have 
enjoyed the right to pollute for payment only for a limited time, say 
five years. Thereafter, property rule protection over the homes would 
be reinstated. This result achieves a better distribution of the burden 
of industrial uses. On the one hand, homeowners would not need to 
forfeit permanently their property rights. On the other hand, large in­
dustrial employers, such as Atlantic Cement, would be given several 
years to develop the pollution control measures necessary for their 
businesses to continue without unduly harming neighboring home­
owners. 
F. Title Shifting Pliability Rules 
Having discussed pliability rules that involve transitions from 
property rules to liability rules and vice versa, we now turn to title 
shifting pliability rules, under which a preset condition triggers the 
transfer of property rule protection from one entitlement holder to 
another.184 The initial holder receives no compensation. The recipient 
of the entitlement in the second stage, however, enjoys full property 
rule protection. Thus, as we discuss in our examples below, the impor­
tance of title shifting pliability rules lies in their being a nonconsensual 
mechanism of transferring property interests.185 
183. 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970). 
184. As we note in our examples in this Section, in stage 2, there may be more than one 
entitlement holder. 
185. As we explain later in this Section, in some cases, title shifting pliability rules dis­
play several advantages over the other major nonconsensual transfer mechanism - liability 
rule protection. These advantages stem from the fact that the subsequent entitlement holder 
enjoys property rule protection under title shifting pliability rules. 
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1. Adverse Possession 
Adverse possession provides a stark example of title shifting 
pliability protection. As Dwyer and Menell noted, adverse possession 
is "[p]erhaps the most startling means of acquiring property 
[rights)."186 Under this doctrine, a stranger can gain title to another's 
land by occupying it - "but only if the occupation is ' indeed wrong­
ful."187 To succeed on an adverse possession claim, the occupier must 
show that her occupation is hostile to the owner's interest, actual, 
open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous for the statutorily man­
dated period of time.188 The successful adverse possessor is not only 
immune against a suit for ejection; she acquires the full panoply of 
rights associated with ownership.189 Effectively, therefore, adverse pos­
session is a legal mechanism that sanctions private takings of property. 
Under our proposed typology, adverse possession is an example of a 
title shifting pliability rule. Adverse possession eliminates the legal 
protection accorded to the original owner from a property rule, and 
instead invests someone else with full . property rule protection over 
the entitlement. As in the case of essential facilities, the reduction in 
186. JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A 
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 76 (1998). In a similar vein, Stoebuck and 
Whitman call adverse possession "a strange and wonderful system." WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK 
& DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 853 (3d ed. 2000); see also Henry W. 
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135 (1918) ("[TJhe doctrine 
[of adverse possession] apparently affords an anomalous instance of maturing a wrong into a 
right contrary to one of the most fundamental axioms of the law. 'For true it is, that neither 
fraud nor might/Can make a title where there wanteth right.' " (quoting Altham's case, 8 
Coke Rep. 153, 77 Engl. reprint, 707)). 
187. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 186, at 853. 
188. See, e.g., DWYER & MENELL, supra note 186, at 77-82; see also Van Valkenburgh v. 
Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28, 29 (N.Y. 1952) (noting that "[t]o acquire title to real property by ad­
verse possession not founded upon a written instrument, it must be shown by clear and con­
vincing proof that for at least fifteen years (formerly twenty years) there was an 'actual' oc­
cupation under a claim of title . . . .  "); Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210, 213 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1970) (restating "the oft-quoted rule that: '[T]o constitute adverse possession, there must be 
actual possession which is uninterrupted, open and notorious, hostile and exclusive, and un­
der a claim of right made in good faith for the statutory period' "). But see O'Keefe v. 
Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980) (noting that "[tJo establish title by adverse possession 
to chattels, the rule of law has been that the possession must be hostile, actual, visible, exclu­
sive, and continuous"); Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431 ,  436 (Wash. 1984) (overruling 
Howard v. Kunto to the extent that the case suggested a good-faith requirement for adverse 
possession, and specifically noting that an adverse possessor's "subjective belief regarding 
his true interest in the land and his intent to dispossess or not dispossess another is irrele­
vant"). However, the O'Keefe court also noted that in the case of works of art, the "intro­
duction of equitable considerations through the discovery rule," id. at 872, which "provides 
that, in an appropriate case, a cause of action will not accrue until the injured party discov­
ers, or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, facts which form the basis 
of a cause of action," id. at 869, "provides a more satisfactory response than the doctrine of 
adverse possession." Id. at 872. 
189. See, e.g., STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 186, at 853 ("Title gained [through 
adverse possession) is usually in fee simple absolute.''). 
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protection depends on the behavior of the property owner. The shift 
of property rule protection is not mandatory, but rather, it is triggered 
by the failure of the owner to assert possession over the property.190 
In the context of adverse possession, pliability rule protection is in­
tended to deter certain types of inaction on the part of property own­
ers. Under the analysis of advocates of adverse possession, the use of a 
title shifting pliability rule in the case of adverse possession promotes 
both efficiency and fairness.191 Traditionally, proponents of adverse 
possession have asserted that the risk of losing the property rule pro­
tection enhances efficient use of resources.192 Adverse possession, on 
this theory, generates two complementary incentive effects: a negative 
and a positive. The negative effect targets property owners; the posi­
tive applies to potential occupiers. By penalizing negligent and dor­
mant owners who "sleep on their rights,"193 adverse pos,session induces 
property owners to handle their property in a socially responsible 
manner. By rewarding productive occupation of land, the doctrine is 
thought to encourage search and use of neglected property. The com­
bination of penalty and reward effectively ensures that property is put 
190. See, e.g., Jeffery Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 2419, 2443 (2001) (suggesting that "adverse possession helps deal with the problem of 
missing owners"); see also Monica Kivel Kalo & Joseph J. Kalo, The Battle to Preserve North 
Carolina's Estuarine Marshes: The 1985 Legislation, Private Claims to Estuarine Marshes, 
Denial of Permits to Fill, and the Public Trust, 64 N.C. L. REV. 565, 606 (1986) (noting that 
"landowners need not receive actual notice that their rights are in jeopardy to trigger the 
running of the statute of limitations . . .  [where] possession . . .  [is] actual, exclusive, open and 
notorious, and continuous and uninterrupted"). 
191. See Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 
15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 161 (1995) (enumerating justifications for the "curious doc­
trine," including (1) preserving evidence, which decays over time thereby increasing the dif­
ficulty of trying cases; (2) penalizing owners for sitting on their rights or using their land 
inefficiently; (3) reducing transaction costs and thereby facilitating market exchange through 
the elimination of old claims to property; (4) supporting the reliance interest that develops 
among occupiers). 
192. See Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of Posses­
sion, 86 VA. L. REV. 535, 559 (2000) ("The economic rationale of adverse possession, con­
ceived as a method of shifting ownership without benefit of negotiation or a paper transfer, 
can be made perspicuous by asking when property should be deemed abandoned, that is, 
returned to the common pool of unowned resources and so made available for appropriation 
through seizure by someone else. The economist's answer is that this should happen when 
it's likely to promote the efficient use of valuable resources."). Sprankling, however, con­
tends that the doctrine may spur overexploitation of wild lands, and thus proposes that wild 
land should be exempt from the doctrine. See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Cri­
tique of Adverse Possession, 19 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 840 (1994) (noting that " [ulnder the 
development model, adverse possession functions to facilitate the economic exploitation of 
land"). 
193. See Stake, supra note 190, at 2434-35 ("According to [the] 'sleeping' theory, ad­
verse possession acts as a civil penalty for wrongdoers. The wrongdoers are those who sleep 
on their rights, and their penalty is to lose those rights."); see also Ballantine, supra note 186, 
at 135 (" 'English lawyers regard not the merit of the possessor, but the demerit of the one 
out of possession.' " (quoting JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 197 
(1913))). 
October 2002) Pliability Rules 57 
to socially desirable uses either by the title-holder or by the adverse 
possessor.194 Adverse possession thus constitutes an informal, non­
market mechanism for improving allocation of resources. 
Second, the use of a title shifting pliability rule in this context has 
desirable information forcing effects. Carol Rose likened property to 
"a kind of speech, with the audience composed of all others who might 
be interested in claiming the object in question."195 The group of po­
tential claimants is not limited to adverse possessors. It also includes 
buyers, lessees, and creditors, who all need to know the identity of the 
rightful owner in order to transact. Thus, clear titles have two desir­
able effects: they facilitate trade and reduce conflicts. From an infor­
mational perspective, therefore, adverse possession serves the dual 
functions of "quieting titles" and facilitating transactions.196 On this 
view, adverse possession is not intended to reward industriousness and 
deter slacking, but rather, to prompt property owners to communicate 
clearly with the rest of the world.197 The use of a title shifting pliability 
rule is responsible for this result. By rewarding clear communication, 
and penalizing vagueness, the title shifting pliability rule preserves the 
informational integrity of the property system, thus leading to more 
transacting and less conflict. Obviously, the importance of this func­
tion varies depending on the effectiveness of the jurisdiction's record­
ing system. 
194. See, e.g, ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 156 (1st ed. 
1988) (noting that adverse possession "tends to prevent valuable resources from being left 
idle for long periods of time by specifying procedures for a productive user to take title from 
an unproductive user"; the rule thereby "tends to move property to higher-value uses, as 
required for efficiency, by redistributing it to aggressive owners"). Following Holmes's sug­
gestion that a person becomes gradually more attached to land he occupies, see Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897), Richard A. 
Posner has argued that adverse possession is in large part about diminishing marginal utility 
of income. "The adverse possessor would experience the deprivation of property as a dimi­
nution in his wealth; the original owner would experience the restoration of the property as 
an increase in his wealth. If they have the same wealth, then probably their combined utility 
will be greater if the adverse possessor is allowed to keep the property." RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79 (4th ed. 1992). But see Omri Ben Shahar, The 
Erosion of Rights by Past Breach, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 190, 225 (1999). Ben Shahar con­
tends, contrary to the common wisdom, that the risk of loss of title, which he calls "erosion," 
is likely to prompt owners who neglect their property to "seek to evict possessors, whereas 
absent an erosion risk [such property owners] would potentially have allowed the efficient 
possessor to quietly maintain use." According to Ben Shahar the main effect of adverse pos­
session is to "facilitate the movement of assets away from absentee owners because it makes 
enforcement of absentee ownership more costly." Id. at 225. 
195. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 79 
(1985) (hereinafter Rose, Origin of Property). For an information-based theory of property, 
see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
196. See Merrill, supra note 102, at 1129 (noting that a "concern which has frequently 
been advanced in the literature on adverse possession is the interest in 'quieting titles' to 
property"); id. at 1139 (noting that the use of a mechanical entitlement determination rule in 
the context of adverse possession facilitates the development of a market in property rights). 
197. Rose, Origin of Property, supra note 195, at 79-80. 
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Finally, the risk of losing the property rule protection deters title­
holders from attempting to extort quasi-rents from adverse posses­
sors.198 Under standard property rule protection, and absent an effec­
tive system for conveying clear information, property owners could 
elicit third parties to improve their property by intentionally misrepre­
senting that the property has been abandoned. Such strategic behavior 
is a trap to innocent occupants. Believing that they will be entitled to 
the full value of their investment, innocent adverse possessors will ex­
pend considerable effort and resources on others' property and ulti­
mately will lose their investment altogether when the true owner 
reasserts her rights.199 The strategic misrepresentation of the true 
owner distorts the decision making process of the adverse possessor by 
creating an appearance of an economic opportunity that in reality 
does not exist. Adverse possession mitigates, to some extent, the ex 
ante incentive of property owners to engage in such strategic misrep­
resentation, and thus, permits "members of the public [to] rely upon 
their own reasonable perceptions."200 Here, too, the importance of this 
function depends on the quality of the recording system and other in­
formation about the status of the property. 
The use of a title shifting pliability rule to transfer the title of the 
property from the original owner to the adverse possessor is also justi­
fied, at times, on fairness grounds. The fairness rationale maintains 
that after a long period of possession, the reliance interest of the ad­
verse possessor should outweigh the formal title of the original owner. 
In doing fairness to the parties, the law must consider the fact that the 
adverse possessor has developed an expectation to retain possession of 
the property, and that the original owner, intentionally or negligently, 
fostered this expectation. Thus, some degree of moral fault attaches to 
the true owner for encouraging a relationship of dependence, which 
she later intended to cut off.201 As Justice Holmes famously stated, 
property "takes root in your being and cannot be tom away without 
198. See Merrill, supra note 102, at 1131-1132; Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 191, at 161-
62. 
199. This problem is particularly acute in cases of boundary disputes. In such cases, a 
property owner permits an adjacent neighbor, who mistakenly believes she is actually 
building on her own land, to encroach on the property owner's land. After the encroachment 
occurred, the encroached upon owner can exploit her neighbor's investment to extract a 
much higher payment from her to settle the dispute than she otherwise 'would. As Merrill 
noted, in extreme cases, the strategically encroached upon owner "may be able to extract not 
only the value of the land but the full value of the addition as well." See Merrill, supra note 
101, at 1131; Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 191, at 161-62 (noting that "when a boundary er­
ror occurs . . .  allowing title to pass to the possessor after a certain period prevents the true 
owner from taking advantage of the possessor's initial error to extort quasi rents created by 
his reliance expenditures"). 
200. Rose, Origin of Property, supra note 195, at 80. 
201. See Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 61 1,  667 
(1988). 
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your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you 
came by it."20'2 Subsequent empirical studies have affirmed Holmes's 
conjecture.203 These studies indicate that people develop an especially 
strong attachment to assets in their possession. This cognitive phe­
nomenon, widely known as an "endowment effect,"204 further tips the 
scale in favor of the adverse possessor. The increasing attachment of 
the adverse possessor to the property raises the subjective value she 
assigns to the property, and as time goes by her claim to the property 
grows stronger relative to the claim of the original owner. The title 
shifting pliability rule undergirding adverse possession provides the 
legal system with a mechanism to move the property to the adverse 
possessor when fairness so requires. It must be noted, however, that 
the requirement that the adverse possessor possess the property "hos­
tilely" significantly undermines the adverse possessor's claim to fair­
ness. 
G. Multiple Stage Pliability Rules 
As we noted earlier, pliability rules need not be restricted to one 
stage. In theory, pliability rules are unlimited in the number of prop­
erty and liability rules they can aggregate into a single pliability rule. 
Multiple stage pliability rules serve the same functions as their two­
stage cousins, and are necessary to accommodate anticipated multiple 
changes in circumstances or a particularly complicated balance of in­
terests. 
1. Eminent Domain 
Arguably the most famous instance of pliability rule protection is 
provided by the law of eminent domain. The power of eminent do­
main authorizes governments to seize private property upon making a 
decision by a process specified in law. By exercising its power of emi-
202. Holmes, supra note 194, at 476-77. 
203. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A 
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI. KENT L. REV. 23, 39 {1986) (opining that 
Holmes "is more faithfully interpreted as anticipating (in a primitive way)" later develop­
ments in cognitive psychology). 
204. On the endowment effect, see generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Daniel 
Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 193 {1991); Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J.  
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980); see also Owen D. Jones, Time Shifted Rationality and the 
Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1141, 1154 (2001) (reporting that "people tend to value an object more highly as soon 
as they possess it - often twice as highly - compared to how they value the same object if 
they had to purchase it," or, more formally, "their indifference curves shift in a systematic 
manner as soon as they acquire a good, increasing the ascribed value of the endowed good 
relative to all other goods"). 
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nent domain, the government may transform the property rule protec­
tion into liability rule protection, so long as it pays "just compensa­
tion,'' as mandated by the Constitution205 - under current doctrine, 
the market value of the property taken.206 So long as exercised for a 
public purpose and accompanied by "just compensation," this power is 
almost limitless. This makes eminent domain one of the most impor­
tant pliability rules. Indeed, it can justly be said that, in light of the 
ubiquity of takings, all property entitlements should be viewed as pro­
tected by pliable protection, at least vis-a-vis the government. 
Here, we characterize takings as resulting from a three-stage 
pliability rule protecting assets: property rule protection, followed by 
liability rule protection, and then property rule protection again.207 In 
this characterization, a government decision to exercise the power of 
eminent domain - to "take" - effects a transition from property rule 
protection in the hands of the original holder to liability rule protec­
tion. Before the government's decision to take the asset, the private 
property holder enjoys property rule protection, even vis-a-vis the 
government. For example, the private property owner has the right to 
exclude government agents seeking to perform warrantless searches, 
as well as to sue the government to abate nuisances to the extent such 
suits are not barred by sovereign immunity. However, once the gov­
ernment decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the entitle­
ment holder enjoys only ordinary liability protection - the right to 
"just compensation" in exchange for the asset. After the government 
takes the property, however, the asset is once again protected by 
property rule protection, albeit this time the entitlement holder is the 
government. 
205. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with­
out just compensation."). 
206. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 9, at 242 (noting that "when land is taken by the 
state for public use, compensation is based on the (objective) market value of the property, 
regardless of the unique public use intended by the government"). In the context of regula­
tory takings, courts have employed a "modified market value test," which measures the ex­
tent to which the regulation at issue diminished the property's market value. See, e.g. , A.A. 
Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 253 F.3d 576, 583 n.7, 584 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the modified market value test was the appropriate measure of damages for a perma­
nent regulatory taking, regardless of whether the taking had a valid public purpose). Cali­
brating compensation has proven contentious. See, e.g. , William A. Fischel, The Offer/Ask 
Disparity and Just Compensation for Takings: A Constitutional Choice Perspective, 15 INT'L 
REV. L. & ECON. 1 87, 193 (1995) (arguing that "latter-day critics who call for enhanced 
compensation under eminent domain would upset a solution to the offer/ask problem that 
had already been struck in scores of constitutional conventions"); Aaron N. Gruen, Takings, 
Just Compensation, and the Efficient Use of Land, Urban, and Environmental Resources, 33 
URB. LAW. 517, 536 (2001) (suggesting that "if the government pays more than market value 
for a property, it may result in under-investment in beneficial public goods that the private 
market cannot efficiently provide"). 
207. Admittedly, this is not the only way of characterizing takings in a pliability analysis. 
See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
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The evident enormity of the power of eminent domain has led to 
discomfort about its use, reflected in the constitutional requirements 
of "just compensation" and "public use,"208 as well as a voluminous lit­
erature about the proper scope of the constitutional Takings Clause.209 
Yet, the power of eminent domain has also been seen as indispensable 
in order to allow government to fulfill its important function of pro­
viding public goods.210 Thus, eminent domain serves a different set of 
goals than, for example, adverse possession. Where adverse possession 
aims to curb neglect of property by the original entitlement holder, 
eminent domain is not concerned with any "wrongdoing" of the origi-
208. At least as a matter of grammar, the phrasing of the Fifth Amendment's Takings 
Clause actually suggests that "public use" is a condition precedent to the payment of "just 
compensation" rather than to the exercise of the taking power. Cf. MORTON J. HORWITZ, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 65 (1977) (citing arguments of 
nineteenth century lawyers that similar provisions in state constitutions did not limit power 
to take for private use). Nevertheless, the Clause has not been read to eliminate the need for 
just compensation where property is taken for nonpublic use. Rather, it has been seen as 
embodying the Anglo-American tradition of limiting the power of eminent domain to cases 
where the taking is for a public use. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 190 n.5 (1977) ("[T)he modern understanding of 'public use' holds that 
any state purpose otherwise constitutional should qualify as sufficiently 'public' to justify a 
taking.") (citation omitted). In recent years, the "public use" requirement has fallen into 
disuse, see, e.g. , Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servi­
tudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1367 n.29 (1982) (observing that "the public use limitation 
has little, if any, constitutional bite today, except in cases involving the condemnation of ex­
cess land"), prompting protest from some scholars. See, e.g. , EPSTEIN, supra note 101, at 161-
81; Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just ls Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE 
DAME LAWYER 765 {1973); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL 
L. REV. 61 {1986). 
209. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 101; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 
(1995); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun­
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings 
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). For a historical overview of takings, see Wil­
liam Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political 
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). Most of the modern literature focuses on the ques­
tion of what acts of government should be considered constitutional "takings" such that just 
compensation must be paid. Thus, the bulk of takings scholarship does not directly concern 
itself with the scope of the power of eminent domain; rather, it addresses the subsidiary 
question of when constitutional limitations apply. 
210. See EPSTEIN, supra note 101, at 4-5 (arguing that the state can only validly exercise 
coercive power to prevent private aggression or to provide public goods); see also Thomas 
W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1569 
(1986) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)). Merrill's review notes Epstein's argument that "when the 
power of eminent domain is used to supply public goods, the surplus will tend to be divided, 
at least approximately, in proportion to preexisting shares of wealth. Those with large pre­
existing shares will obtain large benefits from public goods; those with small preexisting 
shares will obtain small benefits." Id. ; cf. Ugo Mattei, Efficiency as Equity: Insights from 
Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 7 (1994) ("As far as the 
public use requirement is concerned, the economic theory of public goods provides both a 
justification and a limit. The justification is that the government needs to be able to acquire 
the inputs that are necessary to provide public goods which the market cannot easily pro­
vide. The limit is set by the consideration that any private use of the power of eminent do­
main will be inefficient since it produces a result that private parties would not be able to 
reach by bargaining.") (internal citations omitted). 
62 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:1 
nal holder. Rather, eminent domain is used as a tool for transferring 
title in property to a presumed higher-value user. Eminent domain 
takes an asset from private hands and places it in the hands of a gov­
ernment that needs the asset to provide for a public good. The coer­
cive mechanism is necessary in order to overcome strategic difficulties 
that impede bargaining and prevent voluntary reassignment of the as­
set to the government in market transactions. 
The central barriers to successful negotiations overcome by emi­
nent domain come under the heading of strategic behavior and include 
the closely related problems of bilateral monopoly and asymmetric in­
formation. 21 1 
In a situation of bilateral monopoly, there is but one potential 
buyer and one potential seller. Each knows that the transaction cannot 
take place without her cooperation, and each, therefore, attempts to 
extract all the profit from the transaction. The problem of bilateral 
monopoly can be illustrated with the example of a government deci­
sion to build a railway through an isolated valley. There is only one 
railway, and therefore only one potential buyer of valley land. On the 
other hand, the railroad must purchase all the valley parcels along the 
lay of the track; even one hold-out can ruin the project. Each parcel 
owner is thus a monopolist who may attempt to hold out for a higher 
price that will divert the railroad profits to her own pockets. In such a 
211. For a comprehensive review of the literature on strategic barriers to bilateral nego­
tiation, see Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1982) (pointing out 
that disagreements as to how to divide the contractual surplus may prevent successful 
Coasean bargaining); John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 
31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 46 (1993) (hypothesizing that differences in private informa­
tion are a primary cause of bargaining delays); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, 
and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2659 (1994) (observing that in the field 
of intellectual property the valuation problem heightens the possibility of stragetic bargain­
ing); Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated 
Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1198, 1219 (1994) (discussing the problem of bilateral 
monopoly in contract renegotiation). 
On asymmetric information specifically, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Do Liabil­
ity Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221, 223-29 
(1995) ("When each party's own valuation is not known by the other, each party will have 
incentives to misrepresent its valuation in bargaining, hoping to extract more of the bar­
gaining surplus from the other party. Parties may therefore demand too much or offer too 
little, with the result that efficient bargains may not be reached. In this case, one cannot say 
unambiguously whether property rules or liability rules will be superior."); see also Karen 
Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 
NW. U. L. REV. 91, 109 (2000) (defining "asymmetric information" as a situation in which 
"[o]ne party to a contract . . .  has more information about future states of the world than 
does the other party"); cf William Samuelson, A Comment on the Coase Theorem, in 
GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING 321, 331-35 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1985) (argu­
ing that if an entitlement is auctioned in a particular way between the parties rather than 
allocated through bargaining, the problems associated with asymmetric information and 
bargaining can be overcome, but acknowledging that his proposed auctions may be impracti­
cable because they would require the initial entitlement holder to share the proceeds). See 
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56 (4th ed. 1992) ("A good 
economic argument for eminent domain . . .  is that it is necessary to prevent monopoly."). 
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situation, the ex ante price is unknowable, transaction costs may be­
come prohibitive, and the attempt to out-strategize the opponent may 
foil the project altogether. Eminent domain provides the solution by 
permitting the government to take the parcels of land in the valley and 
then open them for use by the railroad. 
The problem of asymmetric information is particularly important 
in this regard. Private entities may often oyercome the bilateral mo­
nopoly difficulty by using straw agents or the like to hide their plans. It 
is far more difficult, however, for the government to hide its plans. 
Parcel owners possess knowledge of the government plans, while the 
government can only guess at the owners' "true" selling price. This 
leads the parcel owners to engage in strategic behavior and rent­
seeking, and burdens the opportunity to successfully negotiate a trans­
action. 
The power of eminent domain provides a solution to these strate­
gic barriers to efficient transactions. On the one hand, eminent do­
main does not disturb the property rule protection granted in ordinary 
circumstances. However, where there is a public need that is likely to 
be foiled by strategic problems, the government may exercise its 
power of eminent domain, triggering a change to liability rule protec­
tion, and allowing the orderly transfer of the asset. The constitutional 
Takings Clause prevents overutilization of this power by limiting the 
power of eminent domain to those cases where reasonable market 
transactions are unlikely. Indeed, the requirement of just compensa­
tion makes the exercise of eminent domain sufficiently costly that, in 
many cases, the government prefers to negotiate a transfer of the asset 
under ordinary property rule protection, rather than force a change to 
the liability stage of the pliability rule.212 
While we classify takings as part of a three-stage pliability rule, the 
rule could also be classified as a title shifting pliability rule with a 
compensation requirement, or as a classic pliability rule as well.213 For 
instance, due to the just compensation requirement, to the original as­
set holder, the pliability rule protection afforded vis-a-vis takings ap­
pears to consist of property rule protection followed by liability rule 
protection.214 In the initial stage, the asset holder enjoys ordinary 
212 See William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from 
the Military Draft for the Takings Issue, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 40 (1996) (observ­
ing that "[w]hen it becomes known that compensation will be made . . .  the government en­
dures" the transaction costs of making settlement (or settlement costs), including the cost of 
negotiating with condemnees, participating in an eminent domain trial (if negotiations fail), 
"the deadweight loss of additional taxes to finance the compensation and the negotiations, 
and the losses from moral hazard on the part of property owners who anticipate that com­
pensation will be made") (internal citation omitted). 
213. Calabresi and Melamed consider eminent domain an example of "mixed protec­
tion," or, under our terminology, a simultaneous pliability rule. Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 5, at 1093. For the reasons discussed in the text, we prefer a different characterization. 
214. See Merrill, supra note 208, at 64 ("[l]n the eminent domain area, which so often 
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property rule protection. When the government makes a decision to 
exercise its power of eminent domain, the asset-holder's protection es­
sentially becomes one of liability rule protection in which the asset­
holder cannot prevent others from impinging upon her exclusive en­
joyment of the asset, but she does have the right to reasonable com­
pensation for such impairments of her rights in the asset. In this sense, 
the takings regime can be,.seen as a classic pliability rule, though the 
act that triggers the shift between the two stages of the pliability rule 
protection - an exercise of eminent domain - endows the new asset 
holder with property rule protection rather than merely liability rule 
protection. Alternatively, in light of the fact that the subsequent enti­
tlement holder enjoys property rule protection like the original enti­
tlement holder, the law of takings can be said to create a title shifting 
pliability rule. 
We prefer the characterization of a three-stage rule in order to 
highlight how the pliability rule embodied in eminent domain over­
comes the "reciprocal takings" difficulty engendered by liability rule 
protection of objects subject to possessory disputes. As we noted ear­
lier,215 Shaven and Kaplow favored property rules to resolve posses­
sory disputes, lest each taking of an object protected by a liability rule 
engender a reciprocal taking, leading to an endless cycle of takings 
and retakings of the object. The pliability rule employed in eminent 
domain resolves this difficulty by limiting use of the liability rule pro­
tection to a single taking. Once the object is taken (in the second stage 
of the pliability rule), property protection is restored, albeit in the 
hands of a presumed higher-value user.216 
parallels private law doctrine, courts have effectively declared that liability rules alone shall 
protect all private property rights.") (internal citation omitted). 
215. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
216. A pliability analysis thus has an important implication for the debate between 
Kaplow/Shavell and Ayres/Balkin, described supra in note 58. Ayres and Balkin resolved the 
reciprocal taking difficulty by noting the possibility of an auction regime. This can be de­
scribed in one of two ways in a pliability analysis. One description would see the Ayres and 
Balkin solution as preserving a single type of rule protection - liability rule protection -
but requiring that the price paid for the taking be altered in each round in order to reflect a 
new value. On this view, Ayres and Balkin did not suggest a pliability rule and did not rec­
ognize that reciprocal takings could be arrested by limiting application of a liability rule. 
A second description - and probably the one that would be favored by Ayres and 
Balkin - would view the suggested auction as a kind of protection distinct from ordinary 
property and liability rules. Under this description, Ayres and Balkin were suggesting a pli­
ability rule in which the taking of an object in a possessory dispute would trigger a change in 
rule protection from liability to auction. Viewed in this light, Ayres and Balkin's suggestion 
is merely one of several ways to resolve the reciprocal takings problem by means of a 
pliability rule. Indeed, any rule that limited the liability rule stage of the pliability rule would 
foil infinite reciprocal takings. 
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H. Elements of Pliability Rules 
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So far, we have demonstrated the pervasiveness of pliability rules 
in our legal system. Before turning to the normative case for pliability 
rules, we summarize some salient features of pliability rules presented 
thus far. 
Pliability rules involve at least three elements: a first stage rule ( ei­
ther property or liability), a triggering event causing a shift between 
stages, and a second stage rule. For simplicity's sake, we have focused 
on two-stage pliability rules, although, as we demonstrated with the 
case of eminent domain, there is no theoretical limitation to the num­
ber of stages in a pliability rule. Additionally, as we have noted, the 
stages of the pliabiJity rule need not necessarily be chronologicaHy se­
quential. Sometimes, as in the case of fair use, for example, the stages 
may coincide chronologically. Nevertheless, in all cases, a triggering 
event or fact is necessary to shift protection from one stage to another. 
For example, in the case of fair use, copyright is best seen as protected 
in the first stage by a property rule, and in the next stage by a zero or­
der liability rule, where the trigger is a type of use that qualifies as a 
"fair use." 
One of the important innovations of a pliability analysis therefore 
lies in a study of triggering mechanisms. On either side of the trigger, 
the protection is either by means of a liability rule or a property rule, 
both of which have been the subject of a rich and illuminating schol­
arly colloquy. However, as pliability rules have not been previously 
identified, there has been no previous discussion of triggering events. 
As we have seen, triggering mechanisms can be based in the passage 
of time, changed circumstances, magnitude or nature of use, or a com­
bination of any of the three. 
Time-centered triggers specify a preset period of protection in 
stage one at the end of which a different type of protection begins. 
The zero order pliability protection used in patent and copyright law 
employs a time-centered trigger. 
Triggers based on changed circumstances are, naturally, less easily 
encapsulated. Thus far, among the changed circumstances that we 
have seen used as triggers are market power, carelessness, and the 
emergence of a higher value use. Excessive market power serves as a 
trigger both in the genericism doctrine in trademark law and in the es­
sential facilities doctrine in the law of antitrust. Careless behavior on 
the part of the property owner is the triggering mechanism in the case 
of adverse possession. Emergence of a higher value use is the trigger 
in the case of eminent domain. Changed circumstances may also be 
combined with the time element as demonstrated by the case of ad­
verse possession. 
Triggers based in the magnitude of the use specify that the ordi­
nary protection offered by the baseline rule are set aside with regards 
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to certain low magnitude uses. Thus far, we have seen such a trigger 
employed in copyright with regard to fair use. 
It is noteworthy that in some instances of pliability protection the 
initial entitlement holder controls the triggering mechanism, while in 
others she does not. Pure time-centered triggers, for example, are not 
subject to the control of the entitlement holder. Patent holders, for in­
stance, lack the ability to alter the twenty year period that signals the 
shift from property to zero order liability protection. Other triggers, 
however, correlate the shift to the behavior of the initial entitlement 
holder. In such cases, the use of pliability rules gives the entitlement 
holder an incentive to self-regulate or act in accordance with socially 
desirable standards. For example, the doctrines of essential facilities 
and genericism incentivize entitlement holders not to accumulate ex­
cessive market power lest the initial property rule protection be re­
placed with a liability rule. The doctrine of adverse possession, on the 
other hand, deters careless behavior on the part of property owners by 
subjecting careless owners to the risk of title loss. 
Ill. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR PLIABILITY 
Having explained and illustrated the elements of pliability rules, 
we now turn to the normative case for using pliability rules. First, we 
show that pliability rules achieve different aims than property and 
liability rules, and we show when pliability rules should be used. We 
then turn to some practical lessons to be drawn from a pliability analy­
sis. Here, we show both how explicit recognition of the category of 
pliability rules suggests possible modifications of existing pliability 
rules and how pliability rules can be used in new areas of the law. 
A. When Pliability Rules Should Be Used 
In this Section, we take up the task of identifying those situations 
in which pliable rules possess a relative advantage over their static 
cousins. 
From a normative perspective, the importance of pliability rules 
lies in that they significantly broaden the range of legal rules available 
to policy makers. We posit that pliability rules are most advantageous 
under the following conditions: (1) when policymakers anticipate sub­
stantially changed circumstances; (2) when competing interests must 
be accommodated in a single rule; and (3) when necessary to tran­
scend the inherent limitations of property and liability rules. In all 
these cases, the use of a pliability rule facilitates planning by the enti­
tlement holder, as well as bargaining between the holder and potential 
acquirers. 
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1 .  Changed Circumstances 
The utility of pliability rules is most obvious in the case of changed 
circumstances. Naturally, changed circumstances may necessitate a 
change in the initial mode of protection in order to adjust the legal 
rule to the changed reality. Pliability rules, due to their flexibility, are 
the ideal policy tool for this task. Pliability rules allow policymakers to 
anticipate changed circumstances and incorporate them into a legal 
rule by identifying the change as the trigger that shifts protection 
modes. Many of the examples of pliability rules that we have cited so 
far have been motivated primarily by changed circumstances. For 
example, the essential facilities doctrine, as its name suggests, aims to 
identify those circumstances in which a property has become "essen­
tial" to competitors, and to use that change as the trigger of a pliability 
rule. Neither a uniform property rule protection nor liability rule pro­
tection is capable of accommodating the challenge of changed circum­
stances. Uniform property rule protection preserves in perpetuity the 
facility owner's right to exclude. As such, uniform property rule pro­
tection is incapable of dealing with the emergence of circumstances 
that render such exclusion anticompetitive. Uniform liability rule pro­
tection, on the other hand, allows for nonconsensual uses, but does so 
at the cost of undermining the owner's incentive to develop her prop­
erty. When circumstances change, therefore, either uniform rule im­
plies some efficiency loss. Pliability rules, by contrast, preserve the ef­
ficiency advantages of both rules, despite the change in the 
circumstances. 
Where the changed circumstances are affected by the behavior of 
the original entitlement holder, pliability rules have an added advan­
tage over the pure protection modes. In such cases, pliability rules may 
be used to incentivize entitlement owners to avoid certain undesirable 
circumstances. For example, in the case of antitrust law, pliability rule 
protection encourages owners to avoid the anticompetitive behavior 
that may lead to the dilution of their property rights. Similarly, the 
pliability rule of genericism in trademark law incentivizes owners of 
strong marks to preserve competition in their field of trade, and to dis­
tinguish their products from competing ones, lest they lose their prop­
erty rule protection altogether. The promotion of self-regulation also 
produces the added benefit of economizing on regulatory and judicial 
costs. 
2. Conflicting Interests 
It is less easily seen how pliability rules are beneficial in accommo­
dating competing interests in a single rule since pliability rules often 
involve sequential, rather than simultaneous, modes of protection. 
Yet, on more careful examination, pliability rules can prove a useful 
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mechanism for balancing incompatible interests. For instance, pliabil­
ity rules may be used to incorporate competing concerns of efficiency 
and justice. Consider patent protection. The time limitation on the 
property rule protection stage in patent law finds grounding, at least in 
part, in concerns of distributive justice. The legal monopoly granted by 
patent protection, while incentivizing inventors ex ante, also subjects 
the public to supra-competitive pricing of new products, such as medi­
cines. Distributively, then, the first stage of property rule protection 
has the undesirable effect of denying the least well-off access to valu­
able, or even life saving, commodities.217 Yet, the same legal monopoly 
that leads to exclusion of the poor is also responsible for the produc­
tion of the invention in the first place. Additionally, many view an in­
ventor's claim over her invention as a moral one. The use of a' time­
centered zero order pliability rule balances these competing interests. 
3. Inherent Limitations 
Pliability protection in patent law also provides an example of the 
use of pliability rules to overcome the inherent limitations in uniform 
property rule or liability rule protection. In addition to being subject 
to the tensions between concerns of efficiency, justice and fairness, 
patent law also must cope with the inherent tensions of efficiency 
within uniform property rule protection. By granting the absolute 
power of exclusion, property rules allow owners to invest optimally in 
their property. Property protection also provides the background 
against which voluntary exchange takes place. However, property 
rules may also create inefficiencies. Property rule protection of mo­
nopolies encourages underproduction, supra-competitive pricing and a 
deadweight loss. Patent protection illustrates both these virtues and 
vices. The ex ante anticipation of enjoying a property right is neces­
sary to spur investment in research and development of new products. 
However, it comes at the ex post cost of supra-competitive prices. Pat­
ent law's pliability rule protection mitigates the inefficient elements of 
property rule protection without entirely sacrificing its beneficial as-
217. Distributive justice concerns are paramount in the work of philosopher John 
Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14-15 (1971) (arguing that "social and 
economic inequalities . . .  are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, 
and in particular for the least advantaged members of society"); Steve P. Calandrillo, Re­
sponsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to Federal Health 
and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 983 (2001) (describing the Rawlsian "veil of ig­
norance" by asking "If one did not know what her position in society would be - i.e., one 
might be among the best off, or the absolutely worst off member - what kind of a society 
would she choose to construct and live in?"). Calandrillo also suggests that "[t)he implicit 
presumption [in Rawlsianism] is that because people justifiably care about fairness and eq­
uity, and are also risk averse, they would choose a society that maximizes the position of the 
worst-off member," and therefore "in the regulatory arena, Rawlsianism would ask how a 
proposed policy affected the most disadvantaged person or group, and not whether overall 
social welfare increased in the aggregate." Id. 
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pects. The initial property rule protection preserves the incentive to 
invest in research; and the subsequent zero order liability rule stage 
cabins the distorting effects of monopolistic pricing. 
Having identified the three primary cases in which normative con­
siderations point toward the adoption of pliability rules, we can now 
suggest two sets of practical results of a pliability analysis. First, we 
examine the extent to which existing pliability rules can be modified to 
better achieve their goals. Second, we uncover situations in which 
pliability rules ought to be employed, but have not been. 
B. Revising Existing Pliability Rules 
In this Section, we return to some of our earlier examples of exist­
ing pliability rules to determine how their goals can be more efficiently 
and fairly advanced. Specifically, we discuss adverse possession, patent 
protection and genericism. 
1. Adverse Possession 
To review briefly, the pliability rule of adverse possession institutes 
property rule protection in both of the two stages of the rule, with the 
shift triggered by time and evidence of owner carelessness (such as ex­
clusive, open, notorious and hostile possession by a trespasser). The 
pliability rule is designed to discourage underutilization of the prop­
erty as well as reward adverse possessors for bringing the property 
back into active use. 
Recognizing that adverse possession embodies a pliability rule en­
ables one to design alternative pliability rules that might better 
achieve the doctrine's aims. As currently structured, the doctrine of 
adverse possession is stark. If the adverse possessor satisfies all the 
statutory elements, she may take title, free of charge, and with full 
property rule protection. However, if even one of the statutory ele­
ments is missing, even in part, the adverse possessor receives nothing. 
For example, where the statutory period is twenty years, an exclusive, 
open, notorious and hostile possession for nineteen years and eleven 
months entitles the adverse possessor to nothing.218 At its extreme, 
then, the doctrine of adverse possession merely incentivizes the owner 
to visit the property, and possibly take corrective action, every nine­
teen years or so. This result may strike some of us as neither fair nor 
efficient. 
The rigidity of current adverse possession doctrine stems from the 
fact that it employs a two-stage, time-limited, title shifting pliability 
218. It is possible that the adverse possessor might have a claim for damages in unjust 
enrichment, or that the owner might have a claim in trespass. For the sake of the discussion, 
we disregard these possibilities. 
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rule. To introduce more flexibility into the doctrine, we note the pos­
sibility of adding several new stages to the pliability rule. This can be 
done is various ways. Assume that, optimally, where state law does not 
provide for an adequate recording system, property owners should in­
spect their property at least once every five years. Under this assump­
tion, the legislature can revise the doctrine of adverse possession to 
give no rights to adverse possessors in the first five years of their stay, 
and thereafter to reduce the owner's rights vis-a-vis the adverse pos­
sessor's a certain percentage of the title. For example, the revised ad­
verse possession rule may state that the successful adverse possessor 
gains twenty-five percent of the title every five years. The rule might 
further provide that if the adverse possession is interrupted after a cer­
tain percentage of the title was acquired by the adverse possessor, she 
will be entitled to purchase the remainder from the original owner. In 
other words, after the first five years of possession, the adverse posses­
sor would receive a call option on the land she possessed, with the ex­
ercise price depending on how much longer the adverse possession 
continues. At the extreme, if the adverse possession continues success­
fully for twenty years, the exercise price would be zero. 
Naturally, the legislature may also create a put option in the suc­
cessful adverse possessor in the liability stage of the proposed pliabil­
ity rule. This would mean that after five years, the adverse possessor 
would not only acquire twenty-five percent of the title to the land but 
also the right to sell this share back to the original owner. Under this 
regime, at the conclusion of twenty years of adverse possession, the 
adverse possessor would have the right to sell back the land to the 
original owner at market price. 
States unsympathetic to adverse possession, such as New York,219 
may also employ a classic pliability rule in this context, but design it in 
a way that would make adverse possession less attractive. For exam­
ple, New York can stipulate that the successful adverse possession 
gains at the end of twenty years, not the title to the land possessed, but 
rather a call option to buy the land at market value.220 
Finally, it is also possible to adopt a still different classic pliability 
rule that introduces an auction mechanism at the liability stage. Under 
this variant, the adverse possessor receives no property interest what­
soever in the land possessed, but merely a right to receive a monetary 
award for identifying the continuous underutilization by the original 
owner. At the end of the statutory period, the title to the underutilized 
land would be auctioned off to the highest bidder, with the proceeds 
219. See, e.g. , Joseph v. Whitcombe, 279 A.2d 122, 126 (2001) ("New York law has long 
disfavored the acquisition of title by adverse possession.") (citations omitted). 
220. Alternatively, the states more sympathetic to adverse possession could give the ad­
verse possessor a put option, thereby requiring the owner to buy the land back at market 
value. 
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divided between the original owner and the adverse possessor. The 
advantage of this system is that it transfers the land to the highest 
value user as determined by the auction. 
2. Patents 
As we explained, patent protection represents an example of a 
zero order pliability rule. Critics of the patent system have long argued 
that a superior way to encourage innovation would be to substitute a 
system of compulsory licensing for the limited property rule protection 
accorded to patentees. Under a system of compulsory licensing, a 
regulator would set the price for use of new inventions, and the pat­
entee would have no power to deviate from that price. To compensate 
the patentee for the loss in revenues, the protection term could be 
longer than that currently provided for by law.221 If set correctly, the 
compulsory license would adequately reward patentees for investing 
in research and development without creating a .social deadweight 
loss. This proposed system of compulsory licenses represents a patent 
system that is based on liability rule protection. Thus, to date, this cen­
tral debate in patent law has proceeded in terms of pure property rule 
versus pure liability rule arguments. 
Our discussion of pliability rules introduces a third option that may 
be superior to the competing ones. Specifically, we propose a classic 
pliability rule that combines initial property rule protection and posi­
tive liability protection. Under the new rule, patentees would be ac­
corded property rule protection for a certain period of time, and then 
the invention would become subject to a compulsory license for an­
other period. For example, Congress can enact a rule under which 
patentees will enjoy property rule protection for ten years, and then 
liability rule protection for another twenty years. During the latter pe­
riod, the invention would be available for a price determined by the 
PTO, or some arbitration tribunal. 
Relative to the current patent system, the proposed pliability rule 
would reduce the deadweight loss associated with patent protection by 
cutting the exclusivity period in half; at the same time, the prolonged 
liability rule period would preserve the incentive to engage in innova­
tion. Relative to a pure system of compulsory licensing, the proposed 
pliability rule diminishes the risk to which inventors are exposed. A 
fundamental problem with compulsory licenses is that it is extremely 
difficult to set the license rates accurately. The license rate, in order 
not to undermine the incentive to innovate, must reflect not only the 
221. See Pankaj Tandon, Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. POL. ECON. 
470 (1982) (contending that the optimal patent would have an indefinite life, for both proc­
ess and product innovations, but even if the patent term is left at seventeen years, compul­
sory licensing may lead to substantial welfare improvements). 
72 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1 
expected profits of the patentee on the current innovation, but also 
the expenditures incurred by the patentees in research projects that 
failed to yield a patentable result. Given that there is no market price 
for new inventions, it is very difficult to set compulsory license rates 
accurately. Granted, the pliability rule we propose incorporates com­
pulsory licensing in the liability rule stage. However, it exposes pat­
entees to a smaller risk of undercompensation by granting them ten 
years of property rule protection. 
The proposed classic pliability rule has an additional advantage 
over its pure liability cousin. Assume that the liability rule equivalent 
of our proposed pliability rule is forty years of liability rule protection. 
In theory, the longer protection period can make up for the fact that 
patentees receive no property rule protection. In practice, however, 
the additional ten years may prove worthless. This is so because newer 
and superior inventions may render existing ones valueless. In addi­
tion, discounting of future values imposes an inherent limitation on 
how much patent protection may be extended. In other words, the in­
centive effect of the early years of protection is much stronger than 
that of late years. 
3. Genericism 
As we discussed, the genericism doctrine in trademark law is 
predicated on a zero order pliability rule. If consumers identify a 
dominant mark not with a particular company, but rather with the un­
derlying product, the property rule protection of the mark holder 
lapses and the mark falls into the public domain. That is, once a mark 
is pronounced generic, competitors of the mark holder can use it free 
of charge. 
We suggest that a classic pliability rule can improve upon existing 
genericism doctrine. Specifically, Congress could replace the current 
rule with one that grants competitors the right to use dominant marks 
in exchange for payment.222 The PTO could then devise a menu of 
prices for the use of dominant marks, with the amount to be paid de­
pending on the dominance of the mark: the more dominant the mark, 
the smaller the payment. Alternatively, once a mark becomes domi­
nant, Congress could require the mark's owner to pay its competitors 
to retain the right to deny them access to the mark. Either way, the 
use of a classic pliability rule with a menu of prices would result in a 
more refined regime than that currently in place. Such a refined sys­
tem would better enhance competition, and is potentially fairer to all 
the parties involved. 
222. The dominance of the mark may be measured by the mark owner's market share in 
the relevant product or service market. Alternatively, the dominance of the mark may be a 
function of the strength of consumers' association of the mark with its associated product (as 
opposed to their association of the mark with the product's manufacturer). 
October 2002] Pliability Rules 
C. Introducing New Pliability Rules 
73 
Pliability rules need not be limited to the circumstances in which 
they are already currently employed. In this Section, we discuss two 
instances of fields of law that could benefit from the introduction of 
pliability rules. Our first example grapples with the problem of the 
anti-commons - the problem of the division of property into too­
small units. Our other example generalizes the anti-commons analysis 
and examines the possibility of exporting some of the principles of 
eminent domain into the private sector - in other words, the creation 
of a private takings power. 
1. Anti-Commons 
The familiar commons problem deals with too many owners in 
common of a single resource. In his "Tragedy of the Commons,"223 
Garrett Hardin posited that overexploitation of the resource would 
result. Hardin illustrated the phenomenon with the example of a rural 
pasture commonly owned by a community of shepherds. He posited 
that the shepherds would allow their herds to overgraze the pasture 
since each shepherd only bears a small fraction of the marginal cost of 
each use while enjoying the full marginal benefit. The result is the 
tragedy of the commons: property held in common will be overex­
ploited.224 Hardin's oft-cited conclusion was that freedom in a com­
mons "bring[s] on universal ruin."225 The traditional solution to com­
mons problems is privatization, leading one owner to internalize the 
full marginal cost of each use. 
Michael Heller noted that a converse problem - which he labeled 
the anti-commons problem - could result if the resource were divided 
into too-small pieces of property, each owned by different owners.226 
In an anti-commons, property interests in a certain asset are dispersed 
among multiple holders, each of whom has an effective veto over any 
given use of the property. Because each property owner has veto 
power over all competing uses, individual owners can behave strategi-
223. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
224. But see Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and In­
herently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, Comedy of 
the Commons] (" (C]ustomary doctrines suggest that commerce might be thought a 'comedy 
of the commons' not only because it may infinitely expand our wealth, but also, at least in 
part, because it has been thought to enhance the sociability of the members of an otherwise 
atomized society."). 
225. Hardin, supra note 223, at 1248. Having said that "[f]reedom to breed will bring 
ruin to all," Hardin goes on to propose that " [t]he only way we can preserve and nurture 
other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed." Id. 
226. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, l l l  HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
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cally with respect to their property or may fail to cooperate with other 
users due to high transaction costs. Heller has observed that, due to 
this characteristic of property rule protection, assets in an anti­
commons commons regime will fall prey to underutilization.227 The 
solution to an anti-commons difficulty is thus aggregation of property 
rights into fewer hands. 
One of the most prominent examples of an anti-commons is pro­
vided by the land regime in Native American reservations. In a well­
intentioned but misguided attempt to protect communal Native 
American lands in the late nineteenth century, Congress provided for 
the allocation of reservation lands among Native American house­
holds, with provisos severely limiting alienating of the parcels.228 Over 
the years, as the lands became ever more divided among heirs, the 
parcels became increasingly fractionated, to the point where some 
land interests produced a lease income of as little as one cent per 
month, and much of the land lay fallow. In 1983, Congress passed the 
Indian Land Consolidation Act, which escheated small portions of 
highly fractionated parcels to the tribe upon death of the owner. How­
ever, in Hodel v. Jrving,229 the Supreme Court ruled that the escheat 
worked an unconstitutional uncompensated taking. As a result many 
Native American lands remain in an anti-commons. 
A similar problem arises with respect to many other properties 
typically passed on to heirs as owners in common. After several cycles 
of intestate succession, the property is likely to have numerous owners 
who have little communication with one another and divergent inter­
ests. Indeed, citing Robert Brown's analysis, Heller and Hanoch 
Dagan recently suggested that such an anti-commons regime was re­
sponsible for the underutilization of African American-owned rural 
land, and, ultimately, the dissipation of African-American participa­
tion in the agricultural economy.230 
A pliability analysis introduces additional tools to resolve anti­
commons difficulties. A properly tailored pliability rule could avoid 
anti-commons problems by altering protection from property rules to 
liability rules when the value of the property interest becomes suffi-
227. Id. at 624, 626 (noting that "[w]hen there are too many owners holding rights of 
exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a tragedy of the anticommons" and proposing 
that "[p]rivatizing a commons and bundling an anticommons can solve the tragedies of mis­
use by better aligning individual incentives with social welfare"). Heller does note that an 
anti-commons regime is ideal where nonuse is the most highly valued "use" of the property. 
228. See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; see also Act of Mar. 2, 
1 889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888 (authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of the Sioux 
Nation into separate reservations and the allotment of specific tracts of reservation land to 
individual Indians, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the adult male Sioux). 
229. 481 U.S. 704 (1987); see also Youpee v. Babbitt, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
230. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 
549, 551 & n.3 (2001). 
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ciently small. For example, in the Indian Land Consolidation Act, in­
stead of providing for an uncompensated escheat, Congress could 
have changed the nature of the interests in Native American Lands 
into a pliability rule in which owners enjoyed property rule protection 
only as long as the value of the interest was sufficiently large, or the 
number of owners in an undivided whole sufficiently small. If the 
value or number of owners crossed a specified threshold, however, the 
owner would enjoy only liability rule protection in her land vis-a-vis 
other tribal members or vis-a-vis the tribe. If, in the hands of the new 
owner,. the aggregate of land interests were to become sufficiently 
valuable or were again concentrated in a sufficiently small number of 
hands, the interest could once more enjoy property rule protection. 
More generally, the use of a pliaf?ility rule could help resolve the 
difficulties produced by successive intestate successions and the re­
sulting multiplicity of uncoordinated heirs. In such cases, policymakers 
could adopt a mechanism of inter-group pliability protection, allowing, 
for example, heirs of intestate succession holding a too-small percent­
age to be subject to liability protection for their small holdings. Such 
liability protection, however, would only apply vis-a-vis other heirs. 
With regards to non-heirs, the owners would enjoy full property rule 
protection. To the extent that anti-commons problems were responsi­
ble for the decline of African-American farming communities, a 
pliability regime could have been a valuable tool in helping to pre­
serve minority rural land ownership. 
Inter-group pliability regimes would enjoy two significant advan­
tages over the Congressional schemes of the last two decades. First, 
since the transition to pliability rules would still entail full compensa­
tion for takings, it would not fall afoul of the Takings Clause. Second, 
because different potential owners could compete for the land until it 
arrived in hands with sufficient other land holdings, without the neces­
sity for potentially costly negotiation, the pliability regime would pro­
vide a more efficient market mechanism for aggregating the property 
holdings.231 
2. Eminent Domain and Private Takings 
Pliability rule protection as a solution for anti-commons underu­
tilization can be seen as part of a broader category of pliability rule 
applications in the realm of private takings. A taking, in a pliability 
analysis, transforms property rule into liability rule protection, and 
231. Given the immovability of the land holdings, the legislation would have to provide 
a mechanism by which persons could seize the land subject to the liability protection phase 
of the pliability rule. One possibility would be by serving notice upon a court and the person 
from whom the land is being seized. In cases of multiple minor holders trying to seize the 
same property, or cyclical takings and retakings of the same property, the court could initiate 
a closed auction. 
76 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1 
then back into property rule protection in new hands - those of the 
government. However, a public taking is not inevitable. Condemna­
tion could pave the way for the interest ending up in private hands in 
the third, property rule phase of the pliability rule. This would be a 
private, rather than public taking. 
Notwithstanding the constitutional requirement that the govern­
ment exercise its power of eminent domain for a "public use,"232 often, 
the taking results in the transfer an object from one set of private 
hands to another. For example, in the famous case of Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,233 the city of Detroit seized a 
number of private lots in order to transfer them to General Motors for 
building a new factory. Vis-a-vis the government, every original owner 
of a private lot in Poletown enjoyed the pliability rule protection 
shaped by the law of eminent domain. This pliability rule protection 
was not altered by the fact that the ultimate destination of the prop­
erty was a different set of private hands. Indeed, imagine that General 
Motors could itself trigger the process for a taking by eminent domain 
by petitioning for city council approval for a private taking. In such a 
case, the original owner would enjoy the same pliability rule protec­
tion as in the case of a public taking, so long as the pliability rule's 
trigger for altering rule protection remained the same. 
While private takings might produce the same incentive effects on 
the original owners as public takings, private takings offer two poten­
tially significant advantages. First, by eliminating an unnecessary ac­
tor, private takings reduce surplus bureaucracy and decrease the cost 
of coordination. If the Poletown case had involved a private taking, 
General Motors could proceed on its own once it had received ap­
proval to exercise a private taking. Instead of coordinating with a gov­
ernment agency to undertake the project, General Motors could nego­
tiate and interact directly with the land owners in Poletown. 
Importantly, as in the case of the public taking, owners dissatisfied 
with their compensation could seek judicial review. Thus, the lack of 
direct involvement of a government agency would not alter the rights 
available to the land owners. 
Second, private takings lead the parties to a more accurate ac­
counting of the costs of their actions, leading to fewer inefficient tak­
ings. Were Poletown a private takings case, General Motors would 
pay the required just compensation directly to the land owners, re­
quiring it to internalize the full cost of the taking. By contrast, in the 
context of a public taking, the Poletown case permits General Motors 
to underestimate the cost of the takings while possibly requiring the 
232 But see supra note 208. 
233. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). 
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government to overestimate the cost.234 Indeed, the takings compensa­
tion costs for the Poletown project greatly exceeded original estimates, 
leading to a depletion of public funds of in excess of $200 million.235 
Private takings could be widely permitted, given the ubiquity of 
the strategic problems justifying public takings.236 The strategic prob­
lems afflicting government acquisitions can be seen in such private 
contexts as railroad and utility land purchases. Indeed, it is for pre­
cisely this reason that private takings were a widely used tool in the 
nineteenth century for railroads.237 
An important caveat must be added here. So long as the trigger 
employed by the pliability rule remains the same, the nature of the 
pliability rule protection depends not at all on the actor who ends up 
with the final entitlement. Thus, a pliability analysis demonstrates 
that, in one sense, private takings are no less defensible than public 
takings. However, when the pliability rule's trigger depends on the 
discretion of a particular party, the identity of the party exercising that 
discretion naturally affects the incentive effects of the pliability rule. 
In our example of a private taking in the Poletown case, we vested dis­
cretion in the same actor as the real Poletown case did - the city 
council. Thus, we did not have to take account of the altered incentive 
effects. 238 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have developed the concept of pliability rules 
and demonstrated its centrality to a full understanding of the entitle­
ment theory sparked by Calebresi and Melamed's classic article. We 
have also shown the pervasiveness of pliability rules in existing legal 
structures, and demonstrated how pliability analysis can transform 
property and intellectual property law. 
Any study of a subject requires an understanding of its animating 
principles. The law is no exception. In light of the widespread use of 
234. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001); 
Merrill, supra note 208. 
235. Editorial, Protect the Taxpayers, DETROIT NE\YS, Oct. 19, 1999 at AIO; Tina Lam, 
Dispute Could Cause Price of Land for Stadiums to Rise, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 17, 
1999, at lB. 
236. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 101, at 169-181 (arguing in favor of private takings 
for public use); Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. 
L. Rev. 203, 236-37, 243 (1978) (proposing that the public use requirement in private takings 
- for example, where landowners need to acquire access to their real property - should be 
allowed only if fifty percent excess compensation is paid). 
237. See Fischel, supra note 209, at 80-89 (1995) (discussing historical evidence of pri­
vate takings by railroads in the nineteenth century). 
238. A fuller analysis of the incentive effects created by discretionary triggering events 
in pliability rules lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
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pliability rules in our legal system, it behooves the academy to update 
its theories to fit a complex legal reality. Given the ability of pliability 
rules to accommodate divergent social concerns, it is not surprising 
that they are already widely used, forcing the academy to play catch­
up. Attention to pliability rules is thus necessary to align theory and 
reality. Moreover, such academic analysis of pliability rules can gener­
ate superior possibilities for decisionmakers, as we illustrated in the 
final Part of this Article. 
Our exposition has provided a taste of the possibilities created by 
pliability analysis, rather than exhausted them. The prism of pliability 
highlights trends and features of the law that are not easily seen oth­
erwise. Listing all the examples lies beyond the ken of this Article. 
But, to illustrate some possible directions for future discussions, we 
close by briefly touching upon a field of law that we have not yet men­
tioned - bankruptcy. 
To be sure, the place of bankruptcy rights in Calebresi and 
Melamed's traditional framework is not easily determined, rendering 
it somewhat difficult to define precisely the various stages of the 
pliability rules created by bankruptcy.239 But there is little doubt that 
the bankruptcy framework follows the broad outlines of pliability 
rules: one type of protection is altered by a trigger (the filing of the pe­
tition) and replaced by another type of protection. Bankruptcy law es­
tablishes that a certain event - the proper filing of a bankruptcy peti­
tion - alters the rights of all persons with regard to the property of 
the debtor. A new set of rules applies to all the debtor's and creditors' 
entitlements while the petition is in bankruptcy court, and after the 
proceeding is completed, the debtor is considered a new person, enti­
tled to a "fresh start." 
However, the importance of bankruptcy for pliability analysis lies 
not in its providing yet another instance of the use of pliability rules in 
legal practice; rather, the example of bankruptcy points to the impact 
of pliability rules on commercial practice, and the importance of un­
derstanding pliability rules as a category distinct from property or 
liability rules. A ware that a potential bankruptcy will trigger a change 
in protections, parties to commercial transactions shape their ex ante 
expectations. The possibility that a bankruptcy petition will alter the 
rights of owners and creditors has led to business practices such as 
credit ratings, risk-based interest premiums and guarantees. It has also 
spawned such legal fields as secured transactions, which seek to shape 
the rights of parties in the post-petition state of the debtor. All these 
239. See Shubha Ghosh, The Morphing of Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Intel­
lectual Property Optimist Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 99 (1997); see also David Frisch, The Implicit "Takings" Jurisprudence 
of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 11  (1995) (examining 
property rights in the context of secured transactions); cf. Merrill & Smith, supra note 94 
(arguing against property analysis of in personam rights). 
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institutions are based upon the parties' awareness that the legal rights 
they enjoy will not necessarily extend infinitely into the future. Yet, 
the parties also know that if a bankruptcy petition triggers a 
rearrangement of their rights, they will not find themselves in 
unknown territory. The post-petition rules of bankruptcy are relatively 
clear and can be planned for. 
Thus, bankruptcy provides an important guide on how the legal 
academy should use pliability analysis. In examining any given legal 
entitlement, we must reject the temptation to engage in a static analy­
sis that freezes the entitlement at the present time. Instead, we must 
adopt a dynamic perspective that incorporates the change that the en­
titlement is due to undergo. Like the commercial actors aware of 
bankruptcy, we too can project change and create structures - like 
securities and pledges in the context of bankruptcy - that take into 
account the ability to change built into the rights created by law.240 
The three decades that have elapsed since Calabresi and 
Melamed's landmark article have demonstrated its durability and use­
fulness. To retain its vitality, however, Calabresi and Melamed's 
model must be adapted to the dynamism of legal rules. Static property 
and liability rules have become basic staples of legal research. It is 
time for their dynamic cousins - pliability rules - to join them. 
240. Before concluding, we note that our Article - like many based on The Cathedral 
- has focused on property and liability as the two basic building blocks identified by 
Calabresi and Melamed. Other combinations are, of course, possible. Consider child labor. 
Until a certain age, a child's labor is inalienable; after that age, a person may sell her labor at 
any agreed upon price, within the bounds set by labor laws. Thus, child labor laws create a 
type of "pliability rule" that involves a transition from inalienability to property rule protec­
tion. 
